This thread is intended for discussion, if any, of the concept developed by Charles Taylor that is outlined here.

A distinction has been made between the porous self and the buffered self. Most cultures throughout time and place have understood the self to be porous, that is, susceptible of influences from, and even interactions with, the gods or God, the stars, ancestors, and/or other "external" agencies. The porous self may seek the protection of one or more such agents. As a plus, the porous self has no problem with the matter of whether or not life is meaningful. It is connected with other agencies that, in some way or other, are also selves, and life is experienced as meaningful, though perhaps insecure. Human mediators of some kind may be valued -- shamans, oracles, soothsayers, priests, pastors. The self is not self-created and wholly self-determined. One is often especially porous vis-a-vis one's family and tribe and, perhaps, religious or cult fellowship.

An example of modern experience of the porous self comes from my own family background. When they were girls, my mother and one of her sisters were together in a room. My aunt was operating a sewing machine and accidentally ran the needle into her finger or thumb. Immediately my mother felt the pain, which was severe. Her sister told her it's OK, she (the sister operating the machine) was fine. In a "porous" understanding of things, this incident would be unusual but not puzzling. (This is how I remember Mom telling the story, which she never made a big deal of.)

The buffered self is basically an artifact of modern habits of thought. The buffered self does not recognize or feel contact with any nonhuman agencies such as I have just indicated. Moreover, the self is buffered from other human selves by understanding relationships largely in terms of "contracts." That is why people now may choose to refer, not to a husband or wife, but to a "partner." A partnership recognizes limits, probably negotiated in some way, even between intimates, and partnerships may be dissolved fairly readily. Over against such relationships, the buffered self recognizes basically no limits to its autonomy. There is no God to whom the buffered self is seriously answerable*, let alone spirits to be placated, astral configurations to be figured out, etc., etc. It used to be said by buffered selves that you "discover who you are," and society must grant you full freedom to do that. But nowadays we go beyond that, and the buffered self says you "create who you are" or "invent who you are"; and it is intolerable if anyone encroaches on your freedom to do so. Society must grant full "rights" for you to re-imagine yourself as you think best, even from a quite early age. The only real limit is your contract with others that ensures everyone else has the same freedom you do to invent himself/herself/themself/zeself, etc.

Suicide is an interesting case from this perspective. For the porous self, two main views of suicide are possible: (1) It is forbidden; just as you did not create yourself, you do not have the right to end your life; (2) It is an appropriate response to shameful circumstance. If you would shame yourself, your family, your tribe, by being enslaved and/or raped, for example, you may rightly kill yourself. If you have failed in battle, you may commit suicide, which will show your courage and atone for your failure. For the buffered self, suicide is a right. How could anyone tell you that you don't have the right to do with your life as you see fit? If you have a "contracted" relationship with some other people, though, you might owe it to them to stick around at least for a while longer, just as (contractually) they should stick around for you in similar circumstances, since suicide does have an impact on others and you should not mess with their lives and rights.

*There may be a sense of a non-demanding, nondogmatic God who might kindly help out good people like oneself, who are in need; this God may be understood as sympathizing when a tragedy has occurred, and may be invoked to help out with the felt need for solemnity at, say, a funeral. Many people in a predominantly buffered society such as our own will think or say that they have no need of an Invisible Friend, but if someone likes to think of the IF, sure, no big deal as long as they don't annoy people who don't need it.

How does the buffered self explain untimely or unwanted death?

I can see that they'd view suicide as a calculated and self-initiated act, conforming to their idea of complete individual agency. They can also see that if they initiate harm to another, they're in violation of their own view of the social contract.

For the porous self, those who recognize external agency, it seems that both a distinct deity and natural forces are understood as having an unavoidable affect on their lives. In fact, there may be no hard-and-fast line between nature and deity.

Does this then imply that buffered self sees all others in a society as either like themselves in the understanding of exclusive self-autonomy, and all others who violate the buffered social contracts as a part of nature, or the agents of a deity of some sort?

You can easily see where this leads to "good people" vs "bad people" for the buffered self, which creates an awful tension, since they'd seem to deny good and evil as objective moral compass points. They'd either make an exception for good/evil as it applies to the recognition of complete self-agency, or they'd have to come around to excusing any and all violations of self-agency by other humans in some fashion.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The characteristic modern person would explain untimely or unwanted death as being just the sort of thing that happens. He or she might ask, in turn: "Why should there need to be an explanation? Look -- at rock bottom, some things just are and some things just happen, and some things are not and some things don't happen." The modern person, then, thinking in this way, is buffered, that is, protected, from troubling thoughts that might otherwise arise.

Untimely or unwanted death may well, on the other hand, be an issue for the porous self of traditional culture. Was a taboo unknowingly violated? Is some god angry? Has some enemy done witchcraft to cause this? Was this person fated to die in an untimely way because of the sin of one or both of his parents or more distant ancestors? Is this evidence of the reality of original sin?

The buffered self never has to face the challenge of dealing with such possibilities.

"Does this then imply that buffered self sees all others in a society as either like themselves in the understanding of exclusive self-autonomy, and all others who violate the buffered social contracts as a part of nature, or the agents of a deity of some sort?"

I'll rephrase that, and you can tell me if I've done so appropriately.

In a buffered society such as ours, evident in our laws, public education, politics, entertainment, and so on, yes, we see or are encouraged to see others as like ourselves, autonomous. This perception might be qualified, however, if some others are placed in a group that is blamed for longterm social troubles based on a failure to recognize everyone's rights. Thus many people of various ethnicities, including White, regard "Whiteness" as historically and at present the principal cause for the troubles suffered by non-Whites. In other words, while everyone theoretically has rights, Whites have had privileges over against everyone else. Some would say, then, that to suppress "Whiteness," Whites should (at least for some unspecified time) have their rights limited relative to others. Don't misunderstand me -- I'm not saying that all members of our society (a buffered society) think this way, but that many do, and that this kind of thinking fits understandably into a buffered society.

The second part of your question -- I'm not so sure I understand.

I'm really interested in how the buffered self sees human-caused harm. Are the agents of such harm part of the "just the sort of thing that happens" reality of the world. Just like a falling tree limb crushing someone? Or a tornado?

Would a buffered self person attempt to control circumstances so as to minimize occurrences? This would imply that they, themselves, have agency sufficient to exert partial control. Would they then apply this to other humans--would they seek to exert agency in avoidance of negative circumstances that are caused by other humans--who ostensibly also have agency?

Do you think that the buffered self individuals differentiate between harm caused by physical circumstance (flood) and harm caused by individual murder or war? That all of this is a part of nature, essentially?

Where does each stand as regards free will vs determinism?

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

"You can easily see where this leads to 'good people' vs 'bad people' for the buffered self, which creates an awful tension, since they'd seem to deny good and evil as objective moral compass points."

I'd agree if you're saying something like this:

The buffered self is buffered because it does not experience itself as acted upon by agents that are not humans like itself though they are like itself in possessing agency.

The buffered self does experience itself as influenced by other human selves, but this doesn't imply major obligations. Once oneself is grown up, at least a little bit, no other self (no other human being) has the right to try to influence oneself except in what I've called a "contractual" relationship. I don't mean that specifically in terms of actual legal documents, of course. The sort of thing I have in mind is common in the unspoken arrangement whereby I will "be there for you" and you then must "be there for me"; and, if my felt needs change, I retain the freedom to "renegotiate" our relationship (and the same goes for you). For example, if you and I became friends when we started West High School at the same time, but as time has passed I've been spending more time with X's group and don't have the same interest in you and the stuff we did together that I used to, you should accept that like a mature person.

For the buffered self, other (human) selves are, in practical terms, all there is other than meaningless nature. This outlook can coexist with a great deal of theoretical interest in aliens or ghosts or fairies, although it usually doesn't.

As for "good and evil" -- for the buffered self, the moral code is basically one's own responsibility, except that one must not "push one's morality" on anybody else. This outlook can coexist with extremely rigorous censure of other people or groups ("cancelation," etc.) who might seem to threaten one's autonomy, e.g. by failing to affirm one's current gender identity.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 9 Aug 23 | 03:26PM by Dale Nelson.

Sawfish wrote:

---I'm really interested in how the buffered self sees human-caused harm. Are the agents of such harm part of the "just the sort of thing that happens" reality of the world. Just like a falling tree limb crushing someone? Or a tornado?

Would a buffered self person attempt to control circumstances so as to minimize occurrences? This would imply that they, themselves, have agency sufficient to exert partial control. Would they then apply this to other humans--would they seek to exert agency in avoidance of negative circumstances that are caused by other humans--who ostensibly also have agency?

Do you think that the buffered self individuals differentiate between harm caused by physical circumstance (flood) and harm caused by individual murder or war? That all of this is a part of nature, essentially?---

The modern buffered society, you may have noticed, looks far, far more than any previous society to government to be the guarantor of the good life, the autonomous life. No society has asked more of its governing elite than those of modern society. Things that people formerly looked to their own enterprise, their family capital (including but not limited to money; also included would be reputation, etc.), their guild, their religious cult, etc. to provide (when times were good!) -- all, and much more, are expected of the public sector.

Thus the "problem of evil" is experienced by modern people, all of us in a buffered society, as primarily a matter of management. It is something to be seen to by government. People in America or Britain a century ago would probably be astonished by the degree of surveillance and monitoring to which law-abiding people are subject, but also, given the amount of money put into social programs, by the degree to which lawbreaking is tolerated, e.g. decriminalization of shoplifting.

And as for natural calamities -- modern people will tend to find fault in that government should have known and done something about this beforehand. Or government should make sure it won't happen again. Pass new laws, create new agencies, employ researchers, etc. And of course sometimes these do good; but sometimes, well, maybe somebody should have known that building that lavish house up in that wooded canyon wasn't a good idea given the potential of wildfires....



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 9 Aug 23 | 03:50PM by Dale Nelson.

On the thread for Comparing Smith to Lovecraft and Howard, Sawfish commented:

-----Dale, let's accept for the sake of discussion that the "mind" has a non-physical dimension to it. It is more than simply the contents of the skull.

This then implies that this extra dimension is akin to what's commonly thought of as spiritual. It is a non-physical attribute that other such entities--those also possessing such "minds"--can readily recognize. There are varying opinions of from whence this attribute derives. I.e., is evidence of it carried in an individual's DNA? If so, this would be a physical marker for a non-physical attribute.

If it is not in any way indicated genetically, and has apparently no physical grounding, does it belong to the "physical" world, at all--and by this I mean is it connected to the physical world, but as yet undetected by such means as we possess to examine the physical world. In other words, it would be like Pluto's existence *before* first being observed in 1930: it existed (so far as we may infer), but was not known. Its existence might have been inferred mathematically from the orbits of other planetary bodies, but was itself unknown.

If it does not belong to the physical world, does it belong to any other organized domain? If so, is it evidence of the possibility of a deity in the broadest possible sense?

OK, let's continue with the existence of undetectable attributes of the human mind. This mind is differentiated from non-human minds by complexity, and especially complexity of sophisticated abstract thought. And yet I'm convince by life experience that many other animal species also possess some of this capability--it's a continuum of mental potency, in a sense. My cat does not believe in a deity, so far as I can tell--but is well aware that he can get into serious peril if he does not avoid certain situations. They're like his ten commandments, in a sense.

Continuing this idea of a continuum, do these other species' "minds" also have a non-physical attribute--one that can be inferred from observation, but cannot be measured or detected by any current means? Perhaps they have less of it, just as they seems to have less capacity for abstract thought.

Dale, we've exchanged. You'll know that I'm basically a materialist *by circumstance*. I'm not committed to it philosophically, but the vast bulk of my life experience--maybe all of it--is best explained by material phenomena. I'm looking here for a new world to explore. I'm looking for a non-deistic undetected non-physical dimension as it affects *all* of the observable physical world. If there's a continuum without a threshold, it implies that every physical object we can observe also has some non-physical attributes. This would include not only the higher animals, but insects, micro-organisms, plants, and inorganic objects like rocks.

But if there is indeed a threshold, above which the non-physical dimensions provide evidence that they exist, where is that threshold, and how did it come about?

Big, wide open door here... :^)

--Sawfish
-----

I'm going to attempt a response of sorts.

Sawfish writes, "Continuing this idea of a continuum, do these other species' "minds" also have a non-physical attribute--one that can be inferred from observation, but cannot be measured or detected by any current means? Perhaps they have less of it, just as they seems to have less capacity for abstract thought."

I think in terms of a hierarchy, more than a continuum.

The visible creation appears to have four levels of being (ontological levels). (I'm leaving said the possibility of invisible creatures for the moment except to say that, if there are nature spirits or fairies or angels or mythological-type gods, they are all in one big group of created beings, with us, rocks, plants, and animals -- over against God. God, the Creator, is not one being among many but just the most powerful one. God, if God exists, is the ground of all being, but distinct from all being, though we may refer to God as a being for convenience.)

The hierarchy:

Rocks and minerals exist. That is something they share with us humans and the rest of the visible creation.

Plants exist, and also have life. Note that with the entrance of life into our account, we are already dealing with something of vital importance whose existence we must infer. We can talk about how plants live, but their life itself we cannot observe. For plants to live is to be able to grow, perhaps synthesize their food from light and water and minerals, and, sure, without these they will die. But their life itself eludes us. No one has ever seen it in itself.

Animals exist and also have life and also have consciousness, as you have noticed with your cat. Like life, consciousness is invisible, not measurable. This, by the way, is really very important for our understanding of the sciences, which must always deal, in one way or another, with what can be measured. But we can't measure the life of plants or animals. We may be able to effect life someday in a lab, but we haven't done so yet, and if we do, we will not be able to say that life came "from nothing" -- our own activity would have to be taken into account. And now today we read a lot about the idea of us creating "artificial intelligence" and many think we will be able to create consciousness. I don't believe this. We may be able to create an imitation of consciousness that is so clever and complex that it fools us. But it will not be consciousness. The robots of ten thousand years from now that seem conscious will still be more like typewriters than they are like us or your cat.

Pause for a moment. Rocks and minerals are abundant, comprising, I suppose, 99.something% of the earth's mass. Plants are abundant on the earth's surface and in the seas, etc. Animals are less abundant than plants but may be found widely distributed....

Rocks and minerals may be split, but they do not reproduce; at least I would not refer to crystal formation as reproduction. Plants reproduce and alter their environment for their benefit by breaking it down, introducing disorder -- for example, roots bursting through concrete. Animals reproduce and alter their environment, making greater order than there was before, as when beavers build dams, birds build nests, and so on. Animals can effect greater order than there was before because they are conscious. They have intelligence; we wouldn't say plants have intelligence, although I understand that, as we have learned more about forests, some scientists are beginning to suspect there is some kind of instinct at work among trees. I suspect it will be found that they may have an appearance of consciousness but the ontological gap between trees and bees will remain.

Human beings possess the attributes of the preceding levels but also exhibit self-awareness. I see no reason to think that even the smartest animals do. Because human beings possess self-awareness, they can work not only on their environment, like plants and animals, but on their inner dimension. When Joe quarrels with his wife and goes to the bar to take the edge off his pain, or when Sally decides to cultivate her memory and start learning poems -- and innumerable other things are done by us to our own inner world -- we show that we are radically different from animals including whales and primates. Even fairly stupid people can make promises. Think of that. To promise anything, you have to experience yourself as a purposive creature, you have to have a sense of time (I now promise that I will, in the future at some point, do this or that), and you have to be able to express this in words, even if just for yourself; at least I can't get my head around the idea that I would promise myself to lose 10 pounds without verbalizing this in some way. I might feel a desire to be ten pounds less heavy but a promise never happens till words are involved.

And humans are less common than animals, which are less common than plants, which are less common than rocks. And at the human level, with our possession of self-awareness, a very great deal of what we are is invisible. I imagine that much that an animal is, is visible, including, as we observe, its desire for warmth, shelter, perhaps for dominance in a group, and so on. We all probably doubt that there is a lot going on there that is never manifested visibly, though it seems dogs dream. But we could never say that about human beings -- that there is little going on that is not visible. Most of what is going on with us is invisible.

So I think you are on the right track in some things you say, Sawfish, but (from my point of view) maybe not catching something crucial when you say that the difference of non-human minds vs. human minds is complexity. I might see our "complexity" as perhaps a byproduct of self-awareness. But that might not be a good way of putting it.

But I've never tried, so far as I remember, to relate the ontological hierarchy/hierarchy of being to the porous vs. buffered concept.

So, some thoughts as they come.

The hierarchy of being was developed in traditional civilization, which was porous, i.e. allowed for the existence of extra-physical relations between human beings, for the involvement of human beings with non-human agencies that impinged on the human self, etc.

I think the traditional, porous culture may have done a better job than our present buffered experience of the world of accounting for, or anyway recognizing, the invisible qualities (life, consciousness, self-awareness). The buffered self helps to maintain its felt autonomy by rationalizing life, consciousness, agency, etc. That tell-tale expression "nothing but" shows itself.


Many people allow for an element of porosity vis-a-vis their pet animals. (A few do even with regard to their household plants.) They refer to a cat or dog and say things like, "You can see what he's thinking." That is, they are saying that our selves can have a (genuine) encounter with the consciousness of a nonhuman creature. People like to talk about their pets as possessing (in effect) selfhood or a degree of selfhood -- as Sawfish's comment above indicates. Hence it becomes natural for many pet lovers to wonder if, or to assert, that their pets "have souls." Souls! But soul is a word, you will note, that doesn't fit very easily in our public discourse, as a society that promotes the buffered self. Oh, we'll use it "metaphorically" in some situations, or allow it to some people but not to others. (I suspect many White people would be embarrassed to say "You have to feel it in your soul" but would not censure a Black person for doing so. A Black public school teacher may be allowed to say she cares about her pupils' souls where a White teacher would receive some kind of check on such usage. A double standard? Why?)

Conversely, some scientists -- vigilant watchmen of the buffered self! -- would like to explain away consciousness itself.

[mindmatters.ai]

Conversely, a porous culture may "start with" such matters as that human beings are souls, and that animals and even plants "have souls" of some type.

Not sure if you've fully clarofied what constitutes self-aeateness, but highly intelligent animals do have self-awareness. The buffered self concept as you've explained it calls to mind Alexis de Tocqueville and Aldous Huxley, of course. Scientific materialism is a permanent blind alley. Without God we are nowhere.

Dale, much deleted for clarity...

Noted as required.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> On the thread for Comparing Smith to Lovecraft and
> Howard, Sawfish commented:
>

... body of my post

>
>
> Dale, we've exchanged. You'll know that I'm
> basically a materialist *by circumstance*. I'm not
> committed to it philosophically, but the vast bulk
> of my life experience--maybe all of it--is best
> explained by material phenomena. I'm looking here
> for a new world to explore. I'm looking for a
> non-deistic undetected non-physical dimension as
> it affects *all* of the observable physical world.
> If there's a continuum without a threshold, it
> implies that every physical object we can observe
> also has some non-physical attributes. This would
> include not only the higher animals, but insects,
> micro-organisms, plants, and inorganic objects
> like rocks.
>
> But if there is indeed a threshold, above which
> the non-physical dimensions provide evidence that
> they exist, where is that threshold, and how did
> it come about?
>
> Big, wide open door here... :^)
>
> --Sawfish
> -----
>
> I'm going to attempt a response of sorts.
>
> Sawfish writes, "Continuing this idea of a
> continuum, do these other species' "minds" also
> have a non-physical attribute--one that can be
> inferred from observation, but cannot be measured
> or detected by any current means? Perhaps they
> have less of it, just as they seems to have less
> capacity for abstract thought."
>
> I think in terms of a hierarchy, more than a
> continuum.

I think this is a good way to go, rather than a continuum, if we also adopt your major demarcation "self-aware".


>
> The visible creation appears to have four levels
> of being (ontological levels). (I'm leaving said
> the possibility of invisible creatures for the
> moment except to say that, if there are nature
> spirits or fairies or angels or mythological-type
> gods, they are all in one big group of created
> beings, with us, rocks, plants, and animals --
> over against God. God, the Creator, is not one
> being among many but just the most powerful one.
> God, if God exists, is the ground of all being,
> but distinct from all being, though we may refer
> to God as a being for convenience.)

Given the four ontological domains, I see implied thresholds at each domain--sort of a gating device based on some level, or lack of, observable sentience. First the non-sentient rocks, then plants, then non-human animate entities, then humans.

Taking a "normal" representative from each domain, we could say that no member of domain n has any of the defining features of the next higher ordinal domain. So no normal rock has the capacity to construct new parts of itself, as a plant can do. No individual plant can travel about to seek sustenance or companionship as an animal routinely does. No animal is self-aware in an abstract sense.

Does this seem agreeable?

>
> The hierarchy:
>
> Rocks and minerals exist. That is something they
> share with us humans and the rest of the visible
> creation.
>
> Plants exist, and also have life. Note that with
> the entrance of life into our account, we are
> already dealing with something of vital importance
> whose existence we must infer. We can talk about
> how plants live, but their life itself we cannot
> observe. For plants to live is to be able to
> grow, perhaps synthesize their food from light and
> water and minerals, and, sure, without these they
> will die. But their life itself eludes us. No
> one has ever seen it in itself.

I'd suppose that the phenomenon of life, as you describe it--its essence--is never seen for any of the three ontologic domains that share "life" as one of its defining attributes, is this correct? Humans (and animals) can see *evidence* of life. This evidence is learned: a dog that encounters a 3-day dead squirrel understands that it is profoundly different from a squirrel that is currently taunting him from a tree limb. It's a combination of observed former behavior of the squirrel and scent. For the dog, that's probably the entirety of it. It is purely physical observation.

>
> Animals exist and also have life and also have
> consciousness, as you have noticed with your cat.
> Like life, consciousness is invisible, not
> measurable. This, by the way, is really very
> important for our understanding of the sciences,
> which must always deal, in one way or another,
> with what can be measured. But we can't measure
> the life of plants or animals.

But we can detect its presence or absence. On what do we base these conclusions> Do we feel that something intangible has fled, or are we more like the dog.

Maybe our first recognition of death is much like the dog's, but then on consideration we consider that something intangible has fled.

> We may be able to
> effect life someday in a lab, but we haven't done
> so yet, and if we do, we will not be able to say
> that life came "from nothing" -- our own activity
> would have to be taken into account.

Let's explore whether the intangible, unmeasurable phenomenon "life" exists without a conscious, sentient observer. Would this sort of life exist in a world with no sentient beings? Would trees exist without humans, e.g.? If so, then the sort of intangible life we're talking about is an artifact of consciousness, and not independent of it. It does not exist without a sentient being postulating its existence.

If living trees could exist without a sentient witness, this seems to reduce life to a complex set of as yet unknown material interactions.

An interesting example would be whether there is an intangible, non-physical attribute to all members of each of the four ontological domains--just as we postulate the mind as being more than is contained within the skull, does my cat's consciousness have a similar non-physical dimension, but in keeping with the bounds of the hierarchy, it has less of this non-physical component? Then would a tree have less, still? Would a rock have less, or perhaps none?

But if a rock has none, let's say, how to account for the spiritual value placed on inanimate, lifeless objects like Ayers Rock, which is a sacred object to native peoples. Does this object indeed have a non-physical aspect that a porous society can detect, or is the sanctity of the object purely a product of the consciousness of the native people?

If the former, it seems like all of the known universe has a non-physical dimension. If the latter, it implies that the idea of the non-physical, as it exists in contemporary mankind, is simply a projection of its own self-awareness.

Then we can move on to sacred animals. Unlike the rock, they have some level of consciousness--like a human, but less so--and do they independently contain this non-physical sacred attribute, like the rock, and if so, are they aware of it? And if not, then this, too, is a product of mankind's awareness, and has no independent existence.

...and now the shaman. A fully human entity who a) believes himself to be possess of non-physical attributes, and his peers agree. It would be an interesting thought: could a shaman exist in a social vacuum? I'd say yes. He'd be sustained by his own belief. He is his own creation.

I'm not saying that this is necessarily true, but it appears to me that the logic leads in that direction.


> And now
> today we read a lot about the idea of us creating
> "artificial intelligence" and many think we will
> be able to create consciousness. I don't believe
> this. We may be able to create an imitation of
> consciousness that is so clever and complex that
> it fools us. But it will not be consciousness.
> The robots of ten thousand years from now that
> seem conscious will still be more like typewriters
> than they are like us or your cat.

At this moment I tend to agree.

But if the opposite is true, and AI is indeed determined to be "conscious" as humanity currently understands the term, it implies that human consciousness is a clever and complex set of learned responses to a given situation.

>
> Pause for a moment. Rocks and minerals are
> abundant, comprising, I suppose, 99.something% of
> the earth's mass. Plants are abundant on the
> earth's surface and in the seas, etc. Animals
> are less abundant than plants but may be found
> widely distributed....
>
> Rocks and minerals may be split, but they do not
> reproduce; at least I would not refer to crystal
> formation as reproduction.

Agreed.

> Plants reproduce and
> alter their environment for their benefit by
> breaking it down, introducing disorder -- for
> example, roots bursting through concrete. Animals
> reproduce and alter their environment, making
> greater order than there was before, as when
> beavers build dams, birds build nests, and so on.
> Animals can effect greater order than there was
> before because they are conscious.

I wonder if the action of plants to break down inanimate objects like rock is actually their form of imposing an order that's beneficial to their continued existence, in the same way that a gopher digs a burrow, or an eagle builds a nest.

It is an attempt to change the status quo to benefit itself, whether tree, bison, or human. Rocks maybe are imposing an order on its constituent free elements--although I don't even believe this myself... ;^)

> They have
> intelligence; we wouldn't say plants have
> intelligence, although I understand that, as we
> have learned more about forests, some scientists
> are beginning to suspect there is some kind of
> instinct at work among trees. I suspect it will
> be found that they may have an appearance of
> consciousness but the ontological gap between
> trees and bees will remain.

Agreed.

You can see why the idea of a continuum at first appealed to me, because it was without precise demarcations.

But I do prefer the hierarchy with thresholds. Maybe there's a continuum within each ontological domain?

>
> Human beings possess the attributes of the
> preceding levels but also exhibit self-awareness.

Could this be the key? Self-awareness?

> I see no reason to think that even the smartest
> animals do. Because human beings possess
> self-awareness, they can work not only on their
> environment, like plants and animals, but on their
> inner dimension. When Joe quarrels with his wife
> and goes to the bar to take the edge off his pain,
> or when Sally decides to cultivate her memory and
> start learning poems -- and innumerable other
> things are done by us to our own inner world -- we
> show that we are radically different from animals
> including whales and primates. Even fairly stupid
> people can make promises. Think of that. To
> promise anything, you have to experience yourself
> as a purposive creature, you have to have a sense
> of time (I now promise that I will, in the future
> at some point, do this or that), and you have to
> be able to express this in words, even if just for
> yourself; at least I can't get my head around the
> idea that I would promise myself to lose 10 pounds
> without verbalizing this in some way. I might
> feel a desire to be ten pounds less heavy but a
> promise never happens till words are involved.
>
> And humans are less common than animals, which are
> less common than plants, which are less common
> than rocks. And at the human level, with our
> possession of self-awareness, a very great deal of
> what we are is invisible. I imagine that much
> that an animal is, is visible, including, as we
> observe, its desire for warmth, shelter, perhaps
> for dominance in a group, and so on. We all
> probably doubt that there is a lot going on there
> that is never manifested visibly, though it seems
> dogs dream.

There is less going on, but I'd say it's a matter of degree, and not an absence of self-awareness.

Let's go with the dog dreaming. I've had a lot of dogs and cats. In my experience, they seem to be dreaming in a way that we'd recognize. In every dream I've had--and oddly I have not had a dreamless night in probably 30 years--most are pretty distinct--the one uniform requirement is that *I* must be the POV. I therefore have to exist as a separate observer of the events in the dream. And watching my dogs/cats, it's evident to me that they are playing out dream events in which they are an actor. At that point it seems that they must be aware of themselves as separate and responsive entities. If this happens in dreams, I'd suppose it also happens when they're awake.

Too, they recognize other animals as being distinct from dogs and cats. They recognize humans as apart from their kind. I think species recognition runs deep in all animals, or it would make reliable reproduction nearly impossible. They recognize dogs and cats that they already know. Maybe in sense, they are aware of themselves as distinct entities. This would require a lot more exploration, though.

So in my mind they have a fair amount of the discerning capabilities that we have, with only limited ways to express it externally. So they are unlikely to compare notes on various topics.

> But we could never say that about
> human beings -- that there is little going on that
> is not visible. Most of what is going on with us
> is invisible.
>
> So I think you are on the right track in some
> things you say, Sawfish, but (from my point of
> view) maybe not catching something crucial when
> you say that the difference of non-human minds vs.
> human minds is complexity. I might see our
> "complexity" as perhaps a byproduct of
> self-awareness. But that might not be a good way
> of putting it.

Could it be the other way around: self-awareness is a product of mental complexity?

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Kipling, as a working notion about self-awareness, I'd say this is indicated when we can think of the self; as, for example, when a child wants to be an astronaut when he or she grows up, etc. About higher animals -- were you thinking of some mirror experiments? I'm not sure that the apparent recognition of the image is true self-awareness.

(It is pleasant to be active on a list in which you could write your final sentence (or one expressing an opposed view, for that matter) without fear of threats of being banned. The Science Fiction and Fantasy Chronicles Forums, where I used to be quite active, has become rather a police state in the past couple or so years.)

Sawfish wrote:

----Given the four ontological domains, I see implied thresholds at each domain--sort of a gating device based on some level, or lack of, observable sentience. First the non-sentient rocks, then plants, then non-human animate entities, then humans.

Taking a "normal" representative from each domain, we could say that no member of domain n has any of the defining features of the next higher ordinal domain. So no normal rock has the capacity to construct new parts of itself, as a plant can do. No individual plant can travel about to seek sustenance or companionship as an animal routinely does. No animal is self-aware in an abstract sense.-----

OK.


----But if a rock has none [no consciousness], let's say, how to account for the spiritual value placed on inanimate, lifeless objects like Ayers Rock, which is a sacred object to native peoples. Does this object indeed have a non-physical aspect that a porous society can detect, or is the sanctity of the object purely a product of the consciousness of the native people?-----

This is a good example to demonstrate that, while we can speak of a "porous" culture, not all porous cultures are the same. Members of the porous Aboriginal culture may believe that Ayers Rock is sentient. The porous culture of the ancient Israelites would say the Rock is not sentient. If the Aboriginal persons had that he has experienced the presence of the spirit that is the Rock, the Israelite might say, "No, but you might have experienced the presence of a bad spirit that imposed on you." A very small minority of relatively recent Christian thinkers may have argued that God would not, cannot, create anything dead, so even rocks might be sentient in some sense, while the majority would say it is a misuse of language to say that rocks are dead because they can be neither dead no alive; if a rock is "alive," may it be killed? -- and so on. My main point is just that not all porous cultures think alike, by any means. But their affirmation of some quality of "porosity" as I've tried to indicate it here would put them all together in this respect, over against a buffered culture.

Sawfish wrote,

----I'd suppose that the phenomenon of life, as you describe it--its essence--is never seen for any of the three ontologic domains that share "life" as one of its defining attributes, is this correct? Humans (and animals) can see *evidence* of life. This evidence is learned: a dog that encounters a 3-day dead squirrel understands that it is profoundly different from a squirrel that is currently taunting him from a tree limb. It's a combination of observed former behavior of the squirrel and scent. For the dog, that's probably the entirety of it. It is purely physical observation.----

This gets into the actually rather mysterious topic of "instinct," which I think is more elusive than a lot of people realize, kind of a convenient catch-all for we-know-not-exactly-what. Offhand I think of it as a wisdom "inherent" in nature. The dog doesn't have to be taught the difference between the dead squirrel and the living; the dog recognizes it somehow. The dog wants to roll on the dead squirrel (at least our old Golden retriever Molly did), while the dog is probably interested in the live, scolding squirrel for very different reasons.

I had written: "But we can't measure the life of plants or animals."

Sawfish commented,

---But we can detect its presence or absence. On what do we base these conclusions> Do we feel that something intangible has fled, or are we more like the dog. Maybe our first recognition of death is much like the dog's, but then on consideration we consider that something intangible has fled.----

I think the question of just when we can tell whether something is alive or not has been a matter of debate from time to time within porous cultures -- as well as our buffered culture, which characteristically tries to settle the matter by appeal to quantifiable factors (brain wave activity, etc.). But for practical purposes societies have means that reliably indicate whether someone is maybe still alive or is indeed dead. That's why there are some specific details in the Gospels to verify that Jesus was certainly dead, e.g. the spearthrust and the observed outflow of water and blood. (This is discussed in a lot of detail in Dr. Pierre Barbet's The Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ.)

Sawfish wrote,

---Let's explore whether the intangible, unmeasurable phenomenon "life" exists without a conscious, sentient observer. Would this sort of life exist in a world with no sentient beings? Would trees exist without humans, e.g.? If so, then the sort of intangible life we're talking about is an artifact of consciousness, and not independent of it. It does not exist without a sentient being postulating its existence.----

This is an interesting topic that might take us away from the porous-buffered one or might circle back to it and be very important to it!

[www.discovermagazine.com]

The above article was pretty fascinating to me!

[www.discovermagazine.com]

Also of interest.

I think the "model," if you like, of "porosity" can deal better with these matters than the materialist philosophy that helps to support, but is not identical to, the buffered self and a buffered culture.

Swafish wrote,

----An interesting example would be whether there is an intangible, non-physical attribute to all members of each of the four ontological domains--just as we postulate the mind as being more than is contained within the skull, does my cat's consciousness have a similar non-physical dimension, but in keeping with the bounds of the hierarchy, it has less of this non-physical component? Then would a tree have less, still? Would a rock have less, or perhaps none?

But if a rock has none, let's say, how to account for the spiritual value placed on inanimate, lifeless objects like Ayers Rock, which is a sacred object to native peoples. Does this object indeed have a non-physical aspect that a porous society can detect, or is the sanctity of the object purely a product of the consciousness of the native people?----

I responded to the second paragraph above, but leave it in for context of the first paragraph.

Here I found myself thinking of an understanding of God that is common among Christian thinkers, at least. It's this. Nothing has existence apart from the sustaining will of God. But nothing, no thing, is of the same "nature" of God. God is the ground of being, but God is also wholly other than any thing. To be truly apart from God would be annihilation -- to be nothing. Yet nothing is an "emanation" of God, a flowing-out from His essence; it is His creature.

So the rock, the tree, the ape, the human, their reality is all grounded in God, they could not be otherwise, but none of them is a "part" of God. I don't know if that's helpful as a response to this comment.

Sawfish wrote:

---Then we can move on to sacred animals. Unlike the rock, they have some level of consciousness--like a human, but less so--and do they independently contain this non-physical sacred attribute, like the rock, and if so, are they aware of it? And if not, then this, too, is a product of mankind's awareness, and has no independent existence.----

Everything "belongs to" God, including we ourselves -- an idea generally displeasing to the buffered self. The Psalms have passages about the mountains, seas, land and sea creatures, and so on as God's. Some of the Psalms even do seem to attribute sentience to inhabitants of the lesser creation, e.g. the fields "clapping their hands" to praise God. So maybe the ancient Israelites allowed for some kind of sentience there too; or it was just poetic license.... or we're not looking at it the right way by saying it's either/or.... .....

Finally, Sawfish asked, "Could it be the other way around: self-awareness is a product of mental complexity?"

I think I'll stick with what I wrote, "I might see our complexity as a byproduct of self-awareness."

When I question myself --

and does any animal, however much "higher," question "itself"? I doubt it could because I doubt it has a self --

When I question myself, I can engage in more complex thinking.

I think I'm about caught up now! Time for a break.

You can doubt it, Dale, only by flying in the face of known biological facts. "However much 'higher'"?. They have self-awareness, yes, unquestionably.

jkh

It's more that I doubt that, when the claim is made about primates' "self-awareness," "self-awareness" means what I have in mind. Apparently to recognize the image in a mirror as "me" is not really the thing I mean. I'm thinking of a capacity to think about oneself, to evaluate oneself, to make decisions about oneself, etc. We know that we have this capacity. If these animals possess this capacity, how was this shown?

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> It's more that I doubt that, when the claim is
> made about primates' "self-awareness,"
> "self-awareness" means what I have in mind.
> Apparently to recognize the image in a mirror as
> "me" is not really the thing I mean. I'm thinking
> of a capacity to think about oneself, to evaluate
> oneself, to make decisions about oneself, etc. We
> know that we have this capacity. If these animals
> possess this capacity, how was this shown?


I think that the threshold act is to understand that the image in the mirror is not another primate or canine, but in fact seems to duplicate my actions, and the animal recognizes this. I'm not sure that my cats, or any dogs, ever truly made the full connection, but what they were pretty confident of was that their reflection was NOT another cat/dog. They may have let it go at that, I don't know.

All of the other perceptive accoutrements are extension of this recognition (if it happens) and are indicators of complexity of abstract thought.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

"All of the other perceptive accoutrements are extension of this recognition" -- I'm not sure that's correct. It feels to me like the profound difference between recognizing a mirror image and having the capacity to evaluate oneself, including the accuracy of one's own memories, is being underestimated. I see no reason to think that any animal has such a capacity or would ever attain it by the exercise of the faculty that enables the mirror-reaction we have had in mind. At most the kind of awareness (I won't call it self-awareness) that Kipling refers to might be a necessary condition for self-awareness as I understand it, without being sufficient, no matter how acute it is, for us to be able to say true selfhood exists. For my part I think I'll leave it at that.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> "All of the other perceptive accoutrements are
> extension of this recognition" -- I'm not sure
> that's correct.

I'm not either.

> It feels to me like the profound
> difference between recognizing a mirror image and
> having the capacity to evaluate oneself, including
> the accuracy of one's own memories, is being
> underestimated.

Dale, that's making a long jump into mental complexity. It's very advanced.

What I'm postulating is that this complexity that permits the recognition of the self as distinct from the remainder of creation exists along...AHEM...a continuum. Once you can perceive that your image is actually in some fashion connected to *you*, as a distinct entity, you're on the path to self-evaluation, analytic exploration of one's memories, etc.

The entity that first crosses that threshold or self-recognition has no guarantee that s/he is capable of fully exploring one's self. They may only get to incomplete self-recognition, and I'd postulate taht many humans cannot get far along this path, although all of them should be able to go farther long it than a dog.

> I see no reason to think that any
> animal has such a capacity or would ever attain it
> by the exercise of the faculty that enables the
> mirror-reaction we have had in mind.

Agreed, although they may well have recognized themselves as distinct from other such animate objects.

> At most the
> kind of awareness (I won't call it self-awareness)
> that Kipling refers to might be a necessary
> condition for self-awareness as I understand it,
> without being sufficient, no matter how acute it
> is, for us to be able to say true selfhood exists.
> For my part I think I'll leave it at that.

So be it.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

"So be it"?! Really, Sawfish? Why capitulate to such absurd generalizations? And demonstrably false statements, as any competent wildlife biologist could tell you guys. Dale's usage, I must say, is a tipoff to his erroneous thought process on this aspect of your otherwise fascinating exchange. He uses ""it" twice in the same sentence, and """they", and "any animal", and so on. If that isn't obvious generalized anthropomorphic self-justification, I don't know what else to call it. Dale, you say (repeating the "I see no reason to think" overture again), that no animal has the capacity for both memory and the ability to evaluate their previous experiences, or to anticipate future results based upon past experiences. You're wrong. Apes and I daresay other species do have this capacity. To deny that is to deny the results of biological research, field studies, and everyday observations of zoologists, farmers and keen observers of animal behaviour in all walks of life. Pleading ignorance is not a good move, gentleman. Checkmate.

jkh

I think you misunderstand me, Kipling. I didn't say "no animal has the capacity for both memory and the ability to evaluate their previous experiences, or to anticipate future results based upon past experiences." I would grant most, at least, of this.

I said I know of no evidence (which leaves open the possibility of that evidence being provided by you or someone else, if it exists) that animals can "evaluate [themselves], including the accuracy of [their] own memories." Even very small children can say, "I forgot." No animal, so far as anyone knows, is ever aware that it has forgotten anything.

I know of no evidence that animals take responsibility for their actions -- much less take responsibility their thoughts. Even small children can, and do, do that: "I will not be afraid at the doctor's today." I know of no evidence that animals can conceptualize possible, different outcomes. Perhaps I will be able to find the note I wrote within the past few years about overhearing a small child reproach another about what could have happened because of what he had done -- I'm sorry that I can't be specific. Does any animal possess any understanding of contingency comparable to this?

I doubt that any animal perceives "itself" as possessing agency. I doubt that any animal cautions "itself" about taking action till it has more information.

Don't be angry with me for writing such remarks. If the data are out there, I'll be interested. Otherwise I retain the sense that there is a difference not just of degree but of kind between even the highest animals and human beings. (Note that I don't think this gives man the "right" to mistreat them. Rather, it implies the responsibility of treating them rightly. No animals, Kipling, can be stewards of us, and, on the other hand, we can't not be stewards of them -- under God, as I believe. We may be bad stewards or good ones, but we are stewards of them, even the ones that protect us, feed us, entertain us with their antics, etc.)



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 14 Aug 23 | 11:01AM by Dale Nelson.

Dale, I really don't have a dog in this fight (YEOW!) but I really do think that perhaps you're coming at this particular argument from a pre-determined position of mankind's ontological superiority to the animal kingdom--that indeed "we" are something else.

Growing up I automatically thought that, not from direct instruction, but by what amounts to "common knowledge"--it's what everyone said and hence was true.

But later as I experienced life, and during most of that time had either cats or dogs, I observed behaviors that looked, well..., thoughtful. I had/have no emotional need to anthropomorphize them (nor do I wish to be a cat--if I acted like a cat, I should rightly be in jail) but I could see things like a cat *really* taking extraordinary care in exploring a new object--like perhaps he had interpreted potential danger to himself. Dogs, while dreaming, going thru what appeared to be a range of emotions, from aggression to anxiety. They were therefore witnessing a dream narrative, with themselves as actors in it. Their subconscious projected their individual identity into the narrative.

Now, I have no idea what this means, but it appears to me that it is not simple; on the contrary, it appears to be fairly complex.

What I propose, Dale, is that mankind is as far advanced along a continuum of mental complexity and abstraction as a bloodhound is advanced over mankind in the sense of smell. We don't lack a sense of smell, but neither do they lack some level of mental complexity.

Mental complexity is "our thing", our evolutionary advantage, just as sense of smell is the canine's "thing".

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

"I really do think that perhaps you're coming at this particular argument from a pre-determined position of mankind's ontological superiority to the animal kingdom"

Sure. I suppose others commenting here likewise bring their own positions to bear on the topic.

I'm open to animal awareness to a greater degree than probably many people are, for example, that some animals may feel something we could call gratitude; or that some pets may sense illness and instinctively comfort the caregiving human.

Perhaps I'm being asked to concede something not about animals, but about what it means for a creature to be a self.

My impression is that, often, the same people who want to minimize the difference between animal and human, want likewise to minimize the difference between human intelligence and "artificial intelligence."

But, again, I think I've shot my bolt; I've said a bunch of things that indicate why I am not willing to attribute self-awareness to animals, and haven't read anything to change my mind about those specific points.

This was a side discussion about levels of being, that was spun from the porous-buffered topic.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 14 Aug 23 | 01:47PM by Dale Nelson.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> "I really do think that perhaps you're coming at
> this particular argument from a pre-determined
> position of mankind's ontological superiority to
> the animal kingdom"
>
> Sure. I suppose others commenting here likewise
> bring their own positions to bear on the topic.

Subjectivity is impossible to avoid, but I wanted to at least be open as to where I was coming from, and more importantly, how I evolved the position over years, starting from a "mankind vs the animal kingdom".

So you openly know my epistemological position.

>
> I'm open to animal awareness to a greater degree
> than probably many people are, for example, that
> some animals may feel something we could call
> gratitude; or that some pets may sense illness and
> instinctively comfort the caregiving human.
>
> Perhaps I'm being asked to concede something not
> about animals, but about what it means for a
> creature to be a self.

I'm not asking for a concession, simply a recognition not that mankind and animals are all members of the same domain, just differentially endowed with various evolved strengths, but merely that this *might* be so.

I'm not even sure of my own position, but based on what I've observed, it looks more likely than not that man is an animal in the same sense that a giraffe is. One is much better at treetop browsing than the other, while the situation is reversed in say, tool-making.

>
> My impression is that, often, the same people who
> want to minimize the difference between animal and
> human, want likewise to minimize the difference
> between human intelligence and "artificial
> intelligence."

I don't see this consideration as belonging in this discussion. It's like baggage.

We could start another discussion centered on an emerging smug arrogance in humanity; I believe that I see evidence of it. It would not have much to do with human/animal self-awareness, however.

>
> But, again, I think I've shot my bolt; I've said a
> bunch of things that indicate why I am not willing
> to attribute self-awareness to animals, and
> haven't read anything to change my mind about
> those specific points.

That's why I said "so be it" previously.

>
> This was a side discussion about levels of being,
> that was spun from the porous-buffered topic.

I think that the differentiation between the two social/psychologic/theological models (porous/buffered) has some level of validity, but I think you're working way too hard to shoehorn all of humanity cleanly into one or the other, and to ascribe a certain moral worth to each category. None of it is that clear or simple, in my opinion.

And now *my* bolt is shot...

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sawfish wrote, "based on what I've observed, it looks more likely than not that man is an animal in the same sense that a giraffe is. One is much better at treetop browsing than the other, while the situation is reversed in say, tool-making."

Not to continue the debate about animal selves, etc. -- but I'd say, Remember that the traditional hierarchy of being allows for human beings to be classified, in some sense, as animals. The higher levels include the lower. We have (or are) something that animals don't have or are not, plus that which animals have, and what plants have, and what minerals have. So I like to write tongue-in-cheek "Scholastic" definitions of Man such as "Man is the animal that makes promises," or "Man is the animal that digresses." We are animals in that we do what animals do (we exist, we have life, we eat, we reproduce, we alter our environment for our benefit), + more.

The traditional ontology allows also for a level above us that would, as a rule, be invisible to our senses. Like ourselves, these beings (call them angels) would exist, be alive (in some sense), be selves, and also possess, presumably, some faculty or faculties that human beings do not possess. These, it has been supposed, could include an immediate perception of truth rather than our acquisition of much, at least, of what we know, laboriously through the senses and by inference; and immortality; if the number of angels was created in a primordial time, there presumably have been no deaths of angels and no matings of angels to replenish the population. This of course is not a proof of the existence of angels. However, the traditional porous self will be able to allow for their existence on the basis of revelation and/or experience, where the buffered self will reject the whole idea.

That, by the way, leads me to something I wanted to throw out to the list. The buffered self culture in which we live has no place for angels, although the genuinely religious minority porous counterculture may do so. A great many people really would not like the idea of angels, good or bad, impinging on human existence. So angels are out of the picture and we breathe a sigh of relief.

But then we propose that there ought to be creatures on other planets. I think this is an important part of the imaginative life of many people. Among the "uneducated," this may take the form of enthusiastic collecting of alien plush toys and what not, enjoyment of conspiracy theories, and so on. Among the "educated," it takes the form of a scientistic assumption that "the conditions for life" in an inconceivably vast universe of uncountable galaxies of uncountable suns must exist, even if we have no evidence for such life; it is just not probable that in all that big universe we are "alone." We at least find the idea very appealing.

(And so Lovecraft populated the universe with a lovingly developed scheme of aliens on Yuggoth and so on. But discussion of Lovecraft and aliens might be better kept on the thread of differences between Lovecraft, Smith, and Howard.)

For a long time I've considered that since the advent of post-modernism Man has done away with religion, but for many of these same enlightened one, they did so prematurely. They still *need* something like religion around which to organize their lives.

This is why we have seemingly irrational socio-political movements, like woke-ism, Qanon, crypto conspiracies, etc. They are grasping, still...

This is why I really like reading Henry Miller, Celine, Houellebecq. They see that post-modernism is empty and that in destroying god figuratively, there is nowhere left to go, if you feel the need for shelter.

I believe that Hunter S. Thompson capitalized on the popularization of the possibility that a moral and perceptive human existing in modern western society, must drug themselves constantly to have a hope of remaining sane.

I'm serious; I believe all of these writers to be of a piece, philosophically, and you can probably throw Bukowski in there, too.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

From the point of view of the porous self and a tradition amenable to it, the "emancipation" that the buffered self and its culture has experienced invites ongoing experiments in finding substitutes for the forsaken reality.

It's interesting, how pervasive drugs are in American society since the 1950s. America and its allies fought a huge war, went home, and had a Reformation, a reformation of culture that would be based on managerialism and pharmaceuticals. The conservative reformation stuck with prescription drugs while the radical reformers explored harder to get drugs. At street level, the San Francisco Federal Building casts its shadow over the dealers and users. (I understand the people who work there have been told to work from home rather than having to keep negotiating street level.)

(For buffered selves such as Lovecraft, the solution is to maintain the sense of reality as a state of things amenable to the buffered self (his philosophy), but to cultivate an elaborate fantasy world known to be such but enjoyed in the imagination. I'm not aware of it if Lovecraft was very seriously interested in the possibility that aliens had visited this planet, for example, even though that is the basis of almost all of his imaginative work, certainly most of his most impressive work. This might be something to discuss on the appropriate thread.)

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> From the point of view of the porous self and a
> tradition amenable to it, the "emancipation" that
> the buffered self and its culture has experienced
> invites ongoing experiments in finding substitutes
> for the forsaken reality.
>
> It's interesting, how pervasive drugs are in
> American society since the 1950s. America and its
> allies fought a huge war, went home, and had a
> Reformation, a reformation of culture that would
> be based on managerialism and pharmaceuticals.
> The conservative reformation stuck with
> prescription drugs while the radical reformers
> explored harder to get drugs. At street level,
> the San Francisco Federal Building casts its
> shadow over the dealers and users. (I understand
> the people who work there have been told to work
> from home rather than having to keep negotiating
> street level.)
>
> (For buffered selves such as Lovecraft, the
> solution is to maintain the sense of reality as a
> state of things amenable to the buffered self (his
> philosophy), but to cultivate an elaborate fantasy
> world known to be such but enjoyed in the
> imagination. I'm not aware of it if Lovecraft was
> very seriously interested in the possibility that
> aliens had visited this planet, for example, even
> though that is the basis of almost all of his
> imaginative work, certainly most of his most
> impressive work. This might be something to
> discuss on the appropriate thread.)

Actually, I could see all those authors I mentioned earlier--Miller, Celine, Bukowski, Thompson--as porous individuals trying to create a buffer from sensuality.

What do you think?

HPL I can see as buffered with the same self-assured certainty that we encounter in some many late 19th/early 20th C fiction, where a supremely buffered character--buffered by classical reason and rationality--loudly exclaim..."That *can't* be!" and quickly run away from the actual implications of an unidentifiable problem.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Doesn't "sensuality" emerge from within the sensual person? To be sure, attractions in the outer world might evoke the innate sensuality. I don't think Taylor was getting at something like that in his porous self vs. buffered self idea.

In a porous culture such as that of the Middle Ages, sensuality was understood as a self-centered (incurvatus) self's activity, which obstructed porosity vis-a-vis the Lord. True, sensual thoughts could be stimulated by spirits inimical to human beings. A 17th-century writer, Isaac Ambrose, as interesting thoughts (I think) about good angels and devils "working with what they find" in the memory of a human being. The good angel might encourage someone to reflect on certain experiences and the devil might work with memories to construct harmful suggestions. Devils, however, could not introduce wholly new images to the human being's attention. If I'm recalling correctly.

Dale, here is a quote from Celine:

"Not much music left inside us for life to dance to. Our youth has gone to the ends of the earth to die in the silence of the truth. And where, I ask you, can a man escape to, when he hasn't enough madness left inside him? The truth is an endless death agony. The truth is death. You have to choose: death or lies. I've never been able to kill myself.”

How might this statement fit the porous v buffered self dichotomy?

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Well, I'd say that Celine's remark fits without question into the buffered outlook. Celine writes as one who is sure that he knows what the data are, and nothing from a transcendent or mysterious realm is or might turn out to be a factor in his calculations. It's clear to him that the choice is death or fantasy to occupy his mind. That's like Lovecraft. He "knew" that the real world is "dead." He occupied much of his time with fantasy, endlessly elaborated by himself and friends, and by memories and impressions related to antiquarianism, which were related to his playful fantasy of himself as a dignified old British gentleman, a contemporary of Samuel Johnson -- and so on.

A despondent inhabitant of a porous culture might regard his feelings as influenced by some inimical spirit outside himself, or by astral influences that appear in this realm beneath the sphere of the moon as unpleasant contagions, or the like. A porous self might relate his despondent feelings to anything from a superstitious notion that some old hag has put her evil eye on him, to some quite sophisticated theological or metaphysical assessment, e.g. he might figure that his despondency is acedia, a temptation to be resisted by means provided by Holy Church, or he might take it as an indication that, though in the body he lives here in space and time, his real nature is one with the timeless and placeless, and he is actually yearning for union with the transcendent One (I suppose a Neoplatonist might take that line); or he might reason that he is feeling low because he is the reincarnation of an ancestor who did bad things, and as long as he is on the Wheel of incarnation (or seems to be!) he must suffer, etc.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> I think you misunderstand me, Kipling. I didn't
> say "no animal has the capacity for both memory
> and the ability to evaluate their previous
> experiences, or to anticipate future results based
> upon past experiences." I would grant most, at
> least, of this.
>
> I said I know of no evidence (which leaves open
> the possibility of that evidence being provided by
> you or someone else, if it exists) that animals
> can "evaluate , including the accuracy of own
> memories." Even very small children can say, "I
> forgot." No animal, so far as anyone knows, is
> ever aware that it has forgotten anything.
>
> I know of no evidence that animals take
> responsibility for their actions -- much less take
> responsibility their thoughts. Even small
> children can, and do, do that: "I will not be
> afraid at the doctor's today." I know of no
> evidence that animals can conceptualize possible,
> different outcomes. Perhaps I will be able to
> find the note I wrote within the past few years
> about overhearing a small child reproach another
> about what could have happened because of what he
> had done -- I'm sorry that I can't be specific.
> Does any animal possess any understanding of
> contingency comparable to this?
>
> I doubt that any animal perceives "itself" as
> possessing agency. I doubt that any animal
> cautions "itself" about taking action till it has
> more information.
>
> I can't be more specific either; however, I will sound out my younger daughter on the subject. She studied wildlife biology in Maine. What about elephants, Dale? There was a rock band called Elephant's Memory, but I was thinking of George Orwell's mad elephant (his experience detailed in "Shooting An Elephant"). The beast, if you'll recall, had become homicidal , making it Orwell's responsibility to show strength by shooting it. I would ask if there was any sense of deliberative "agency" invoved in its behavior. Suicidal thoughts? Then there is Bram Stoker's story, "The Squaw", which you must have read. Not a favorite of yours I would imagine, but I had a black cat like that once!

jkh

Kipling, I'm not sure what you have in mind exactly in asking "what about elephants?"

I'd just ask that anyone interested in the discussion we were having about animals and people, would review the things I actually wrote (and I don't mean to insinuate that you didn't).

I think that my "agenda" is more that I want people to see that we are very different from animals, with the corollary that, to understand ourselves, we need a lot more than the endeavor (usually described as "science") whose agenda is to minimize or explain away those differences. We can benefit from the arts and literature -- except that a very great deal of contemporary art and writing participates in an unwholesome agenda. Incidentally, I have for years wanted to track down something I saw in the 1980s in (I thought) a British magazine that the English Department at the University of Illinois subscribed to. It was an interview with or an article about the "screaming popes" artist Francis Bacon. He said, as I remember it, that he had a sort of mystical experience, a moment of extraordinary perception about existence, once when he noticed a pile of dog feces on a sidewalk. I don't suppose anyone can help me with this...

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Kipling, I'm not sure what you have in mind
> exactly in asking "what about elephants?"
>
> I'd just ask that anyone interested in the
> discussion we were having about animals and
> people, would review the things I actually wrote
> (and I don't mean to insinuate that you didn't).
>
>
> I did, and you made the following statements: "I doubt that any animal perceives 'itself' as possessing agency. I doubt that any animal cautions 'itself' about taking action till it has more information." What I was suggesting you to consider about the elephant is that animal's well-researched cognitive abilities. Either you don't know or weren't interested, but elephants are one of the few animals known to have self-awareness; specifically, Sawfish's speculation about dogs seeing their reflection in a mirror has been tested. A dog may bark at his reflection, but the elephant can recognize himself. It is considered the fourth most intelligent animal behind the Orangutan, the Bottlenose Dolphin, and the Chimpanzee. The elephant brain has three times as many neurons as the human brain. Elephants have the ability to identify languages, use tools, shoe empathy and grieve for their dead, mimic human voices, and recognize close companions after long periods of separation (20 years in one case). It is even claimed that a young male elephant showed "deductive reasoning skills equivalent to those of a 4-year-old" human. Elephants remember long routes to watering sites used in former years after they are forced away from sites they have been using, and "possessing agency", have switched to these alternative sites because they have contingency awareness, perceiving an imminent or ongoing threat to their survival in their present location. So, your use of devious phrases such as, "so far as anyone knows" (obviously you don't know what experts know) very clearly shows your confirmation bias, as Sawfish also recognized.

Here is the link for my source: baanchang2022@gmail.com

jkh

Kipling, let's just have the discussion focus on the original topic, OK? You seem to be pressing for an admission from me of being mistaken, of looking for confirmation of my biases, etc., i.e. to put me on the defensive. Why would that specifically be important for this discussion? If it isn't, let's just focus on the subject and leave out the personalities. I'm not interested in pushing you about yours.

Sure, the exploration of the porous self vs. buffered self idea has bearing on the lives of each of us. Myself, I understand existence to be such that "porosity" allows for, so to say, greater human flourishing than the culture of the buffered self. Others, such as a good friend of mine (now 86), are persuaded that the prevalent buffered culture is superior over against the now-minority porous counter-cultures (there are more than one). In a face to face conversation we could talk these things over. Irritation rather than enhanced conversation and "iron sharpening iron" seem likely to develop in the relatively impersonal context of a discussion board.

Lately, we were discussing specifically the traditional hierarchy of being as kind of a side trail from the main porous-buffered matter. Would you throw out that hierarchy or modify it -- ?



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 16 Aug 23 | 12:22PM by Dale Nelson.

Kipling, the link you sent appears to be someone's email address.

"The elephant brain has three times as many neurons as the human brain."

This

[www.theguardian.com]

probably has implications regarding the importance of the quantity of neurons.

However, I'm not too interested in typed conversation with someone who describes me as using "devious" expressions. If someone is in error, it might be possible that he's honestly in error. But "devious" means "dishonest." You are out of line.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Kipling, let's just have the discussion focus on
> the original topic, OK? You seem to be pressing
> for an admission from me of being mistaken, of
> looking for confirmation of my biases, etc., i.e.
> to put me on the defensive. Why would that
> specifically be important for this discussion? If
> it isn't, let's just focus on the subject and
> leave out the personalities. I'm not interested
> in pushing you about yours.
>
> Sure, the exploration of the porous self vs.
> buffered self idea has bearing on the lives of
> each of us. Myself, I understand existence to be
> such that "porosity" allows for, so to say,
> greater human flourishing than the culture of the
> buffered self. Others, such as a good friend of
> mine (now 86), are persuaded that the prevalent
> buffered culture is superior over against the
> now-minority porous counter-cultures (there are
> more than one). In a face to face conversation we
> could talk these things over. Irritation rather
> than enhanced conversation and "iron sharpening
> iron" seem likely to develop in the relatively
> impersonal context of a discussion board.
>
> Lately, we were discussing specifically the
> traditional hierarchy of being as kind of a side
> trail from the main porous-buffered matter. Would
> you throw out that hierarchy or modify it -- ?

For me, perhaps a part of the problem is that it's hard to imagine a truly buffered self as being pervious to the problems faced daily. I'd suggest that the porous self is in frequent anxiety, and that this is balanced off by experiencing the sublime. I see the buffered self as the opposite: it's largely impervious to daily problems largely because it thinks it has an adequate and more importantly a *definitive* answer to these problems. But they tend to lack access to the transcendent.

I'll state right now that I think it would be very hard to find relatively pure examples of the porous and buffered selves, and I'd say that maybe it's easier to find pure porous than pure buffered, and in the case of buffered selves, this is because they almost invariably keep a sort of "hedge". THey are often self-described agnostics, and they will follow certain forms "just for good measure".

And yet they would purport to be fully engaged modern and enlightened 21st C individuals. They'd readily deny God, and anything they see as superstition. If you explained buffered vs porous (and pivotally, they accepted the existence of this model) they'd probably self-identify as buffered--with a bit of smug pride too, I'd say.

How do you see this, Dale?

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sawfish, probably the majority of modern Western people -- who have buffered selves -- would not use "buffered" to describe themselves because their beliefs preclude the existence of things from which they are buffered. They would say they are quite open to experience, open to and value new discoveries, etc. But the assumptions prevalent in their culture, which they accept as true, would rule out the agencies and meanings that porous cultures allow.

Thus, if someone has an epiphanic experience (through falling in love, or through a religious experience, or through a drug, etc.), the mainstream takes it that these are (they must be) explicable in terms of what we already understand, about body chemistry, emotional and imaginative suggestibility, and so on. An overly simplistic way of putting the difference between the porous outlook and the buffered outlook is that the porous allows for miracle, while for the buffered, this category is not allowed, and is one that has done a tremendous amount of mischief in keeping people ignorant, and even under the thumbs of oppressors (priests and so on).

Among our authors here at ED, Machen and Blackwood would allow for miracle ("miracle" if you prefer), and, so, with all their really important differences of belief, would have porous selves and identify with minority groups (not ethnic minorities, but cultural minorities), while, I take it, Lovecraft would definitely be (in Taylor's terms) a buffered self with a strong desire to influence other people to join him in this, hence his long letters. But Lovecraft would not accept Taylor's terminology. He would probably say there are people who agree with him, and then there are people who do not; those people are unscientific and either regrettably ignorant or deplorably dishonest with themselves.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Sawfish, probably the majority of modern Western
> people -- who have buffered selves -- would not
> use "buffered" to describe themselves because
> their beliefs preclude the existence of things
> from which they are buffered. They would say they
> are quite open to experience, open to and value
> new discoveries, etc. But the assumptions
> prevalent in their culture, which they accept as
> true, would rule out the agencies and meanings
> that porous cultures allow.

I suggest that this is why we're having troubles: we persist in using Taylor's terminology to describe types of "self" while those same "selves" do not recognize either term as used.

So let's not quibble about whether they'd call themselves buffered or enlightened, or...

Same for the porous selves. We--you and I and other participants--know what's meant by the terms, or rather in what circumstance to use them--so when I say that someone would self-label as buffered, this means they'd use whatever term they affix for the traits we're discussing as "buffered".

This could be "enlightened", "hip", "well-informed", "woke", etc. and these are as I understand the terms "buffered".

Also, we talk about porous/buffered selves and porous/buffered cultures. This is not good because without further definition it seems to disallow a porous self existing in a buffered culture. So we need further clarification on that point--can a culture be hybrid (roughly 50-50); can it be majority porous/buffered?

>
> Thus, if someone has an epiphanic experience
> (through falling in love, or through a religious
> experience, or through a drug, etc.), the
> mainstream takes it that these are (they must be)
> explicable in terms of what we already understand,
> about body chemistry, emotional and imaginative
> suggestibility, and so on.

I maintain that selves who'd self-label as "enlightened", or "worldly" (therefore buffered, as I understand it) might make an exception for legitimate deeply felt emotions. I think you're far too ready to see unadultered examples of either "self"--as you describe them they're little more than caricatures--and I'm beginning to wonder if Taylor's model is not too hopelessly and artificially constrained to actually make any sense in the real world--and by this I mean to either a porous or a buffered culture.

It is like he found a few identifiable traits/tendencies and is trying to come up with a Grand Unified Theory of sociology. I'm afraid that it's not going to be that simple.

> An overly simplistic
> way of putting the difference between the porous
> outlook and the buffered outlook is that the
> porous allows for miracle,

I am probably buffered, in Taylor's terminology, but here's a real, current story.

We have three cats. In Feb of 2021 one was diagnosed with feline lymphoma and we were advised to make preparations for as gentle a euthanasia as available and that this would be needed within weeks, and maybe 2 months at the most. As of this date he's still alive with no apparent ill effect; he was seen last spring by a different vet who confirmed the diagnosis and prognosis, recognized that the earlier prognosis had not come to pass, and had no explanation for it.

So is this a miracle? If it's not a miracle, note well that neither we, nor the vet, has made any attempt at explaining his good fortune in terms of materialistic science. So we just filed it away under "we just don't know".

According to my understanding there is no room in the buffered model for this kind of nonsense. So, are we (me, my wife, my daughter, and two vets) porous of buffered selves?

> while for the buffered,
> this category is not allowed, and is one that has
> done a tremendous amount of mischief in keeping
> people ignorant, and even under the thumbs of
> oppressors (priests and so on).

All right, when a buffered self sees behaviors/traits/social phenomena that make no sense to him, AND he sees no answers in science or rationality, how does he attempt to resolve this?


>
> Among our authors here at ED, Machen and Blackwood
> would allow for miracle ("miracle" if you prefer),
> and, so, with all their really important
> differences of belief, would have porous selves
> and identify with minority groups (not ethnic
> minorities, but cultural minorities), while, I
> take it, Lovecraft would definitely be (in
> Taylor's terms) a buffered self with a strong
> desire to influence other people to join him in
> this, hence his long letters. But Lovecraft would
> not accept Taylor's terminology.

I a beginning to see Taylor's terminology, and his assumptions, to be very, very inflexible.

> He would
> probably say there are people who agree with him,
> and then there are people who do not; those people
> are unscientific and either regrettably ignorant
> or deplorably dishonest with themselves.

If you want to suppose that the buffered self is like an educated person in a gothic novel, who, on seeing the pin-pricks in the neck, after hearing about vampires from an ethnologist, shakes his head and says "No, it couldn't be that, old man," sure. But in my life I've met very few people like that and have mostly encountered this type in contrived fiction.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sawfish wrote, "I'd suggest that the porous self is in frequent anxiety, and that this is balanced off by experiencing the sublime. I see the buffered self as the opposite: it's largely impervious to daily problems largely because it thinks it has an adequate and more importantly a *definitive* answer to these problems. But they tend to lack access to the transcendent."

I mean to comment on the issue of anxiety. Yes, I am sure you're right about some porous societies, at least, being very anxious. Phenomena we would treat as due to microbes, they might experience as effected by dissatisfied ancestors, hostile spirits, etc. Indigenous people whom enlightened folk such as ourselves would not want to be disturbed by Western missionaries, may actually find profound relief when they adopt the new faith and no longer worry about the dead, etc.

From what I know, there was quite a bit of variation -- as far as we can tell -- between various porous-self societies as regards anxiety. I have the impression that the ancient Egyptians may have been relatively cheery folk.

A curious thing is that modern society, favoring the buffered self, is so troubled by anxiety. The more this society becomes itself (under the managerial regime discussed by N. S. Lyons), the more, it seems, anxiety is a problem, so that you have a great many young people, especially girls, who experience racking anxiety that their grandmothers would not have undergone. You have the phenomenon of well-fed, decently-treated, physically healthy young people finding nothing better to do with their lives than kill themselves. It's bizarre.

The buffered culture of the modern West may be dying out, and "porosity" returning. The "New Age movement" that you will be well acquainted with in the Pacific Northwest is an indication of this. "Satanist" motifs sell apparel and music. And so on. Children of buffered parents are seeking some kind of porosity.

Let me return to your later comments later.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 16 Aug 23 | 03:56PM by Dale Nelson.

Here's a buffered news story, Dale:

[www.idahostatesman.com]

:^)

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Here's the prologue of Hemingway's The Snows of Kilimanjaro:

Quote:

Prologue
Kilimanjaro is a snow covered mountain 19,710 feet high, and is said to be the highest mountain in Africa. Its western summit is called the Masai “Ngàje Ngài,” the House of God. Close to the western summit there is the dried and frozen carcass of a leopard. No one has explained what the leopard was seeking at that altitude.

Porous?

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sawfish wrote, "Also, we talk about porous/buffered selves and porous/buffered cultures. This is not good because without further definition it seems to disallow a porous self existing in a buffered culture. So we need further clarification on that point--can a culture be hybrid (roughly 50-50); can it be majority porous/buffered?"

It's a while since I read that short book on Charles Taylor's thought. The "porous self" and the "buffered self" are his terms. I suppose that a society can be mostly supportive of porosity or bufferedness, but that within it there may be minority groups of dissenters. If the standard view of Democritus is right, then he and his disciples might have been a minority group within a society in which the porous self was predominant.

A society could be tolerant; it could allow porous selves and buffered selves to coexist without disabilities. This would be a liberal society. I'm not sure that history will show that such societies have staying power. The United States have done (historically speaking) rather well in this regard (though with intolerance in other areas), but I'm not sure this will continue to be true.

"I maintain that selves who'd self-label as "enlightened", or "worldly" (therefore buffered, as I understand it) might make an exception for legitimate deeply felt emotions. I think you're far too ready to see unadultered examples of either "self"--as you describe them they're little more than caricatures--and I'm beginning to wonder if Taylor's model is not too hopelessly and artificially constrained to actually make any sense in the real world--and by this I mean to either a porous or a buffered culture.

"It is like he found a few identifiable traits/tendencies and is trying to come up with a Grand Unified Theory of sociology. I'm afraid that it's not going to be that simple."

Sure -- I imagine a social theory must always be simpler than the reality it attempts to illuminate.

"...here's a real, current story.

"We have three cats. In Feb of 2021 one was diagnosed with feline lymphoma and we were advised to make preparations for as gentle a euthanasia as available and that this would be needed within weeks, and maybe 2 months at the most. As of this date he's still alive with no apparent ill effect; he was seen last spring by a different vet who confirmed the diagnosis and prognosis, recognized that the earlier prognosis had not come to pass, and had no explanation for it.

"So is this a miracle? If it's not a miracle, note well that neither we, nor the vet, has made any attempt at explaining his good fortune in terms of materialistic science. So we just filed it away under 'we just don't know'."

Sure. A possible explanation is that the test(s) for feline lymphoma are less accurate than was assumed. It's possible, too, that there's an as-yet-undetected but ultimately physical interaction between you and your cat, that helps his immune system, etc. Both of these would allow the buffered self to remain intact. Or it could be proposed, from a minority point of view over against official U. S. society (public education, science funding, etc.) that humankind has a relationship, of divine origin, with animals, which has been mostly lost since the Fall, but that is "arch-natural." There is a book by a vet named Joanne Stefanatos called Animals and Man: A State of Blessedness, that relates stories of saints who had a sort of Paradisal relationship with otherwise wild, shy or dangerous, animals.

[alaskasbakery.com]

It could be, then, that vestiges of humankind's relationship as God's "viceregents" remain; your love for your cat effected something like a miracle.

Who knows?

In any event, I'm glad to read of your cat's continued companionship with your family.

We have had two kittens added to our previous four, for two weeks now, Giles and Aino (officially Jenny).



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 16 Aug 23 | 06:30PM by Dale Nelson.

Sawfish Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Here's a buffered news story, Dale:
>
> [www.idahostatesman.com]
> ticle278306763.html
>
> :^)


Charles Fort, call your office.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> "I really do think that perhaps you're coming at
> this particular argument from a pre-determined
> position of mankind's ontological superiority to
> the animal kingdom"
>
> Sure. I suppose others commenting here likewise
> bring their own positions to bear on the topic.
>
> I'm open to animal awareness to a greater degree
> than probably many people are, for example, that
> some animals may feel something we could call
> gratitude; or that some pets may sense illness and
> instinctively comfort the caregiving human.
>
> Perhaps I'm being asked to concede something not
> about animals, but about what it means for a
> creature to be a self.
>
> My impression is that, often, the same people who
> want to minimize the difference between animal and
> human, want likewise to minimize the difference
> between human intelligence and "artificial
> intelligence."
>
> But, again, I think I've shot my bolt; I've said a
> bunch of things that indicate why I am not willing
> to attribute self-awareness to animals, and
> haven't read anything to change my mind about
> those specific points.
>
> This was a side discussion about levels of being, that was spun from the porous-buffered selves topic.

You "haven't read anything to change your mind", are open to such data "if it exists," but didn't respond when I put some facts forward except to say I was out of line (whatever that means) in doing so. Seems rather disingenuous, don't you think, Dale? Pretentious snobbery, perhaps?

jkh

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Sawfish wrote, "Also, we talk about
> porous/buffered selves and porous/buffered
> cultures. This is not good because without further
> definition it seems to disallow a porous self
> existing in a buffered culture. So we need further
> clarification on that point--can a culture be
> hybrid (roughly 50-50); can it be majority
> porous/buffered?"
>
> It's a while since I read that short book on
> Charles Taylor's thought. The "porous self" and
> the "buffered self" are his terms. I suppose that
> a society can be mostly supportive of porosity or
> bufferedness, but that within it there may be
> minority groups of dissenters. If the standard
> view of Democritus is right, then he and his
> disciples might have been a minority group within
> a society in which the porous self was
> predominant.

This I could see.

>
> A society could be tolerant; it could allow porous
> selves and buffered selves to coexist without
> disabilities. This would be a liberal society.
> I'm not sure that history will show that such
> societies have staying power. The United States
> have done (historically speaking) rather well in
> this regard (though with intolerance in other
> areas), but I'm not sure this will continue to be
> true.

In point of fact it doesn't matter whether a society is tolerant or not *so far as the actual belief systems of its constituents*.

Just as the Spanish had "crytpo Jews", so might woke society contain crypto porous selves.

>
> "I maintain that selves who'd self-label as
> "enlightened", or "worldly" (therefore buffered,
> as I understand it) might make an exception for
> legitimate deeply felt emotions. I think you're
> far too ready to see unadultered examples of
> either "self"--as you describe them they're little
> more than caricatures--and I'm beginning to wonder
> if Taylor's model is not too hopelessly and
> artificially constrained to actually make any
> sense in the real world--and by this I mean to
> either a porous or a buffered culture.
>
> "It is like he found a few identifiable
> traits/tendencies and is trying to come up with a
> Grand Unified Theory of sociology. I'm afraid that
> it's not going to be that simple."
>
> Sure -- I imagine a social theory must always be
> simpler than the reality it attempts to
> illuminate.
>
> "...here's a real, current story.
>
> "We have three cats. In Feb of 2021 one was
> diagnosed with feline lymphoma and we were advised
> to make preparations for as gentle a euthanasia as
> available and that this would be needed within
> weeks, and maybe 2 months at the most. As of this
> date he's still alive with no apparent ill effect;
> he was seen last spring by a different vet who
> confirmed the diagnosis and prognosis, recognized
> that the earlier prognosis had not come to pass,
> and had no explanation for it.
>
> "So is this a miracle? If it's not a miracle, note
> well that neither we, nor the vet, has made any
> attempt at explaining his good fortune in terms of
> materialistic science. So we just filed it away
> under 'we just don't know'."
>
> Sure. A possible explanation is that the test(s)
> for feline lymphoma are less accurate than was
> assumed.

Two separate tests.

> It's possible, too, that there's an
> as-yet-undetected but ultimately physical
> interaction between you and your cat, that helps
> his immune system, etc. Both of these would allow
> the buffered self to remain intact.

However, that's not what either us or the 2nd vet attempted to do. It was just a smile at the unexplained "good" fortune of the cat.

And yet I'd suspect that my wife, the vet, and me might honestly be characterized as buffered selves *most of the time*.

> Or it could
> be proposed, from a minority point of view over
> against official U. S. society (public education,
> science funding, etc.) that humankind has a
> relationship, of divine origin, with animals,
> which has been mostly lost since the Fall, but
> that is "arch-natural." There is a book by a vet
> named Joanne Stefanatos called Animals and Man: A
> State of Blessedness, that relates stories of
> saints who had a sort of Paradisal relationship
> with otherwise wild, shy or dangerous, animals.
>
> [alaskasbakery.com]-
> dvm-cva-cvc-mhma-wildlife-rehabilitator/
>
> It could be, then, that vestiges of humankind's
> relationship as God's "viceregents" remain; your
> love for your cat effected something like a
> miracle.
>
> Who knows?

Which, as I understand Taylor, is fine for porous selves, but not to be expected from buffered selves.

I am absolutely fine without an answer of any kind for very many topics; life has taught me that, at least. Most people I know are, too, to a greater or lesser degree. Again, by far the most pure buffered selves I've encountered are in literature, as representative characters.


>
> In any event, I'm glad to read of your cat's
> continued companionship with your family.
>
> We have had two kittens added to our previous
> four, for two weeks now, Giles and Aino
> (officially Jenny).

I enjoy our discussions, Dale, but I judge Taylor's hypothesis as I understand it to be unsupportable. It's a waste of time, really. He's far too rigid and far too--well, it looks to me like he's not dealt much with people, or if he has, he's being quite subjectively selective about what he's seen. He is forcing his data through the eye of a needle of his own device.

Normally, I try not to be prematurely judgmental about new ideas, but Taylor's is pretty clearly a doozy.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

No problem with that take on Taylor. But I'm glad I brought it up -- we had some good discussion, and Hespire, I think it was, had an exceptionally interesting quotation from CAS to Derleth that came up in the course of this conversation.

Kipling Wrote:
-
>
> You "haven't read anything to change your
> mind", are open to such data "if it exists," but
> didn't respond when I put some facts forward
> except to say I was out of line (whatever that
> means) in doing so. Seems rather disingenuous,
> don't you think, Dale? Pretentious snobbery,
> perhaps?


Aw, come on, Kipling. I did not say you were out of line to "put some facts forward." I said it was out of line to accuse me of being devious. Now moreover I'm disingenuous, pretentious, and a snob, and there were some other things back there too. You can do better than this kind of thing. At any rate you'll have to if you want me to respond to you.

As for the elephant facts, you sent someone's email address, not a link to a source. Was the idea that I should email this person and say, "Hi, you don't know me, but a guy who calls himself Kipling sent me to you to ask about some elephants?"

; )

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> No problem with that take on Taylor. But I'm glad
> I brought it up -- we had some good discussion,
> and Hespire, I think it was, had an exceptionally
> interesting quotation from CAS to Derleth that
> came up in the course of this conversation.

Yes, good stuff, Dale!

:^)

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Kipling Wrote:
> -
> >
> > You "haven't read anything to change your
> > mind", are open to such data "if it exists,"
> but
> > didn't respond when I put some facts forward
> > except to say I was out of line (whatever that
> > means) in doing so. Seems rather disingenuous,
> > don't you think, Dale? Pretentious snobbery,
> > perhaps?
>
>
> Aw, come on, Kipling. I did not say you were out
> of line to "put some facts forward." I said it
> was out of line to accuse me of being devious.
> Now moreover I'm disingenuous, pretentious, and a
> snob, and there were some other things back there
> too. You can do better than this kind of thing.
> At any rate you'll have to if you want me to
> respond to you.
>
> As for the elephant facts, you sent someone's
> email address, not a link to a source. Was the
> idea that I should email this person and say, "Hi,
> you don't know me, but a guy who calls himself
> Kipling sent me to you to ask about some
> elephants?"
>
>. My middle name is Kipling and the email link was a simple mistake. Not responding to evidence of cognitive abilities you categorically denied the exist of in any and all animals (I understand you spoke in generalities, but even so the subject had been broached) suggests a confirmation bias as wide as the Cumberland Gap. I'm glad that your sense of humor seems to be in better shape than mine is these days, Dale, and I apologize for the offensive words I used.

jkh

Thanks, Kipling. I think I usually said that I was "aware of no evidence for" various faculties in any animals, rather than "categorically denying" such. But never mind.

If we're going to discuss animals and mankind more, rather than the buffered-porous topic for the thread (which might well be talked out), I'd be interested in a link to a good article relating to the points you've wanted to make about elephants, etc. I'd learn something.

But also, are you aware of evidence relating to a number of points or questions I offered regarding animal consciousness? (Be patient with me if I missed a substantive response to any of these.)

I wrote:

It feels to me like the profound difference between recognizing a mirror image and having the capacity to evaluate oneself, including the accuracy of one's own memories, is being underestimated. ...No animal ... is ever aware that it has forgotten anything [as far as I know].

I know of no evidence that animals take responsibility for their actions -- much less take responsibility for their thoughts. Even small children can, and do, do that: "I will not be afraid at the doctor's today."

Human beings make promises: they can relate together the three essentials for making promises, namely (1) a sense of personal identity, (2) a sense that the future is different from the moment we're in now, (3) language; at least, I can't imagine how one would make promises without some kind of verbalization, if only in one's own mind.

Human beings restructure their inner world. They say: I'm going to learn to play an instrument, or I'm going to get plastered, and so on. They choose to alter their inner world for their benefit and perhaps that of others. Is there any evidence detectible to us that animals choose to restructure their inner worlds? Of course they do restructure their inner worlds in the sense that they learn from experience, as I can see with our two rescue kittens. But so far as I know, it is instinct, not a personal consciousness, that prompts them to do this. They can't, so far as I know, choose not to. I can choose not to learn all sorts of things: how to drive a car, type blood, whatever. I can choose not to learn things that might challenge my present opinions. Is there any evidence that this is true of animals?

I think these are fair points and questions. I think one can agree with each and all of them without dismissing the qualities of animals that you have mentioned. My wife believes that our pets (cats and dogs) can sense it sometimes when we are feeling unwell and they may respond by snuggling up. I guess I'm not sure that they do sense our illnesses, but I think it's possible and I like the idea.

I would hesitate to so that if animals lack the qualities I've mentioned above, they are nevertheless selves. Granted the qualities you've mentioned, one could say that they suffice for us to say selfhood exists. This difference maybe could be resolved by each of us saying "this is how I understand selfhood." Isn't that the issue between us -- not that I dispute the things you have said about elephants; do you dispute any of the points I've made above?


As for things that work against our notions, what comes to my mind again is that research about people with extreme hydrocephaly who should be severely retarded (if they live at all), and yet may lead normal lives. (I included a link to The Guardian's article on that yesterday.) A friend of mine who looks to science plus his own experience for reliable knowledge basically replied, "Huh." This was after he had stated to me that he had no interest in an idea of consciousness or mind that was not within the skull. Wow! The same article tells of a woman who had heart and lung transplant. After the operation she began to feel cravings for food she hadn't care for before. She began to feel an erotic interest in attractive girls. Eventually she learned that the donor had been a teenage male. But my friend was content to shrug this off.

PS Nothing I've written should be taken to imply that I deny the humanity of idiots (=persons with profound mental disability), etc. They are human like us but their ability to "realize" or to express their humanity may be impaired.



Edited 2 time(s). Last edit at 17 Aug 23 | 03:20PM by Dale Nelson.

Dale, I do agree with your main points, and thanks for the reprisal. Yes, we need a reliable source on the subject of the brain function of higher primates. I think the complex behaviors I gave examples of are, like the ape devising a tool with surprising geometric perception, exceptions to the general state of wide divergency between all animals and humans. A historical survey of advancements in this field would also be interesting. In the early Victorian age there must have been much discussion on the subject of our responsibility for the natural world as urbanization began. Elizabeth Gaskell is an author whose novels treat realistically of those times. So, I'm reading Bram Stoker's weird tales now and hoping to get some good comments about his work. I think Taylor's concept is very useful, and am continuing to review your exchanges on it; there was a lot of neat observation on both sides, and I didn't mean to sidetrack you guys. On the subject of cats, my wife has felt and seen a black cat (Zita), that we lost several years back around our house. I also felt her presence once but haven't seen her. This means we are Porous Selves, doesn't it? Cheers!

jkh

It sure sounds like porosity to me, unless you explain away those impressions in materialist fashion somehow.

Delighted to see a Gaskell reader here. I have an anecdote. I was teaching a British novel course, just a few students, one of whom I knew and liked but I knew he worked at a filthy job at the edible bean plant -- clearing out dust and rat corpses, whatever. He was a gruff-voiced, imposing-looking smoker. Anyway, I thought he might think one of the novels -- Gaskell's Wives and Daughters -- was not his kind of book!

HE LOVED IT!

At least he sure seemed to read it well and liked it.

That's a promising topic -- early Victorian consideration of animals and stewardship of them, etc. I wish I knew something about that. Ever read Richard Jefferies? I used to have his (late Victorian, I think) book Wood Magic with an introduction by Richard Adams, but gave it away without having read it.

It's fun how cats interact with us. We have a one-eyed tabby, Tess, who spontaneously started this hilarious thing in which she sits back on her hind legs and starts sort of paddling in the air with her forepaws. She was rewarded for that and of course does it often when she catches my eye (the reward has to be a very small amount of the food she likes so that she doesn't get too plump). I don't suppose she thought it through, figured out just what would catch my eye and amuse me (and dinner guests, etc.), but it works that way. You wouldn't see a feral cat do that sort of thing. So, does the cat somehow get on the right wavelength to elicit some behavior from me? It looks that way.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 17 Aug 23 | 04:27PM by Dale Nelson.

Probably so! We brought Zita back from the brink as a kitten so maybe that has something to do with her continued presence, she being both seen and heard here. I enjoyed Wives and Daughters, so started to read Mary Barton/A Tale of Manchester Life (1848). Didn't get far (it was last Winter), but this was a very influential novel and I should get back to it. Back notes describe it as "part of a nineteenth-century British trend to understand the enormous cultural, economic and social changes wrought by industrialization". She developed two strongly contrasting settings, the main one focused on the urban poor. Have not read Richard Jefferies. Did you know that Stoker's manuscript of The Undead (his working title for what became Dracula) was found in a Pennsylvania barn in the 1980s? Lovecraft got wind of the fact that Stoker had sent it stateside and thought maybe his good friend Edith Miniter (a regionalist, fellow amateur journalist and close friend of his) had been asked to help Stoker out with the epistolary style. I guess somebody did. My details here are not necessarily accurate, you know... That new movie just out,"The Last Voyage of the ---------is based on the story in Dracula that Stoker based on an actual derelict account. I will not go see it because it looks like just another animated gore fest, with the vampire looking ridiculously inhuman.

jkh

Kipling Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Dale, I do agree with your main points, and thanks
> for the reprisal. Yes, we need a reliable source
> on the subject of the brain function of higher
> primates. I think the complex behaviors I gave
> examples of are, like the ape devising a tool with
> surprising geometric perception, exceptions to the
> general state of wide divergency between all
> animals and humans.

Kipling, I think that it's very important to consider that what you've described, that tends to illustrate how lacking many animals as compared to humans are when they come to play on our "home turf" (abstract problem solving) needs to be counterbalanced against the reality that we do equally poorly when playing on their home turf. Echo location by bats, migratory bird navigation, etc.

So as I've said before, humanity is not simply equal to animals in all other mental areas, but superior to them in sense of self and ability to think abstractly, humans are much better in this area, and woefully inadequate in others. It's fortunate that the single area of immense superiority acts as an evolutionary wildcard, enabling humans to avoid the lack of the other mental traits of animals.

I'm not a big fan of the animal kingdom, per se, but I do tend to see humanity as a differently-abled member of the animal kingdom, not something apart. Just a hell of a lot more complex and sophisticated.

> A historical
> survey of advancements in this field would also be
> interesting. In the early Victorian age there must
> have been much discussion on the subject of our
> responsibility for the natural world as
> urbanization began. Elizabeth Gaskell is an author
> whose novels treat realistically of those times.
> So, I'm reading Bram Stoker's weird tales now and
> hoping to get some good comments about his work.
> I think Taylor's concept is very useful,
> and am continuing to review your exchanges on it;
> there was a lot of neat observation on both sides,
> and I didn't mean to sidetrack you guys. On the
> subject of cats, my wife has felt and seen a black
> cat (Zita), that we lost several years back around
> our house. I also felt her presence once but
> haven't seen her. This means we are Porous Selves,
> doesn't it? Cheers!

Yes! Porous!

:^)

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sawfish wrote, "I do tend to see humanity as a differently-abled member of the animal kingdom, not something apart."

A "differently-abled animal" sounds close to the traditional idea of man as the rational animal. We're not apart from them in that we're animals (in ways we've discussed already), but we are apart from them -- a difference of kind and not just of degree -- in being "rational." That's how I see it, anyway.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Sawfish wrote, "I do tend to see humanity as a
> differently-abled member of the animal kingdom,
> not something apart."
>
> A "differently-abled animal" sounds close to the
> traditional idea of man as the rational animal.
> We're not apart from them in that we're animals
> (in ways we've discussed already), but we are
> apart from them -- a difference of kind and not
> just of degree -- in being "rational." That's how
> I see it, anyway.

Fair enough, Dale.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Another way of getting at the porous self vs. buffered self thing occurs to me. Something bropught to my mind just now an essay by Mary Ellen Ashcroft called "Last Thoughts by the Tombstone Pizzas," from 1988.

A little of it may be seen here:

[www.christianitytoday.com]

Ashcroft describes an incident in a supermarket in which a woman suddenly died of a heart attack, as I recall. Maybe she heard someone say, "At least she died quickly." This gets her thinking about how many people today would say the ideal death is the one in which you fell pleasantly asleep and didn't wake up -- no pain. She says that in earlier times, the thought of dying "unprepared" was disturbing. Hamlet decides not to assassinate Claudius because Claudius has been praying -- i.e. he is prepared, and Hamlet doesn't want to send the guy off while he's in a state of grace.

The context is Christian, but my guess is that in traditional cultures the idea was that you wanted to die aware that you were dying: you could hear the tribe lamenting your imminent loss, etc. Cultures like the ancient Greeks might approve of suicide in some circumstances, but the idea was that you prepared your soul for this (I'm thinking of the death of Socrates as depicted by Plato). I know of nothing in ancient literature that suggests the sudden, painless death is ideal.

But in a highly buffered culture such as ours, just having one's light switched off at a decent age is attractive -- it being understood that any other people about whom one cares will not be left in a seriously awkward place by your death, of course.

Sound about right?

By the way -- somewhere here I recently said that I believe our generally buffered Western society is turning again towards a porous understanding of things. You might think that, because I'm a Christian, I would be pleased. Nope, not really. Actually, I think many Christians who have lived as long as I have, and who will live long enough to see what's developing, will miss those "good old days" when Western society basically offered the possibility of being a porous self only in terms of the Christian church (and Judaism for Jews), the only alternative being humanism and/or atheism. David Hume, Voltaire, Darwin, Freud, Bertrand Russell, Madelyn Murray O'Hair -- these we could respond to fairly readily, and though we took them seriously, we Christians, they weren't exactly weird, creepy, alarming in a supernatural way!

That was kind of nice for Christians like me. I can still remember such times a little. We had our champions in the lists (some of whose names would probably mean nothing to most non-Christians; John Warwick Montgomery anyone?), but the books they wrote were instructive. The debates could be held on some common ground. Porous Christian vs. buffered mainstream thinker -- we could argue according to the rules of logic, the evidence of history, etc. Neither perhaps convinced the other very often. But it could at least be kind of fun. Early in my academic career, say 40+ years ago, I shared an office with a guy of mainstream buffered views. I think he liked our discussions about as much as I did.

But the "New Age movements" (I use the plural for something that could include everything from pop commercialized versions of Native American ceremonies to Suzuki Zen to Wicca to UFO cults), quaint as it often was, was a sign of hunger for porosity. And porosity "with a vengeance" we may be getting. Here's a link to a long article by Naomi Wolf, a Jew, a "third wave feminist," advisor to Bill Clinton and Al Gore, etc., who may have gone off her head with "conspiracy" theories. But take a look at this to see why a Christian might not exactly welcome a revived, emphatically non-Christian, porosity:

[brownstone.org]

Like I said -- porosity with a vengeance!

I expect this article, if anyone reads it, may be primarily for entertainment value. So -- I hope you enjoy the entertainment. At any rate I have now made it clear that in what I've written, I sure did NOT mean to suggest that longing for "any old porosity" -- in fact definitely NOT for the old porosity.

If you do read Wolf's article, please read it to the end.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 27 Aug 23 | 09:16AM by Dale Nelson.

Dale Nelson Wrote:

> [brownstone.org]
> ods-returned/
>
>I hope I have
> now made it clear that in what I've written, I
> sure did NOT mean to suggest that longing for "any
> old porosity" -- in fact definitely NOT for the
> old porosity.
>
> If you do read Wolf's article, please read it to
> the end.

Perhaps this was overlooked or perhaps it was looked at and no one wanted to comment, which is OK. I'm not endorsing all of it, certainly.

Kipling Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Dale, I do agree with your main points, and thanks
> for the reprisal. Yes, we need a reliable source
> on the subject of the brain function of higher
> primates. I think the complex behaviors I gave
> examples of are, like the ape devising a tool with
> surprising geometric perception, exceptions to the
> general state of wide divergency between all
> animals and humans. A historical
> survey of advancements in this field would also be
> interesting. In the early Victorian age there must
> have been much discussion on the subject of our
> responsibility for the natural world as
> urbanization began. Elizabeth Gaskell is an author
> whose novels treat realistically of those times.
> So, I'm reading Bram Stoker's weird tales now and
> hoping to get some good comments about his work.
> I think Taylor's concept is very useful,
> and am continuing to review your exchanges on it;
> there was a lot of neat observation on both sides,
> and I didn't mean to sidetrack you guys. On the
> subject of cats, my wife has felt and seen a black
> cat (Zita), that we lost several years back around
> our house. I also felt her presence once but
> haven't seen her. This means we are Porous Selves,
> doesn't it? Cheers!

Kipling, earlier in this discussion you mentioned elephants. I ran across this article

[www.thenewatlantis.com]

which I'm reading now.