Sawfish wrote,

---Let's explore whether the intangible, unmeasurable phenomenon "life" exists without a conscious, sentient observer. Would this sort of life exist in a world with no sentient beings? Would trees exist without humans, e.g.? If so, then the sort of intangible life we're talking about is an artifact of consciousness, and not independent of it. It does not exist without a sentient being postulating its existence.----

This is an interesting topic that might take us away from the porous-buffered one or might circle back to it and be very important to it!

[www.discovermagazine.com]

The above article was pretty fascinating to me!

[www.discovermagazine.com]

Also of interest.

I think the "model," if you like, of "porosity" can deal better with these matters than the materialist philosophy that helps to support, but is not identical to, the buffered self and a buffered culture.

Swafish wrote,

----An interesting example would be whether there is an intangible, non-physical attribute to all members of each of the four ontological domains--just as we postulate the mind as being more than is contained within the skull, does my cat's consciousness have a similar non-physical dimension, but in keeping with the bounds of the hierarchy, it has less of this non-physical component? Then would a tree have less, still? Would a rock have less, or perhaps none?

But if a rock has none, let's say, how to account for the spiritual value placed on inanimate, lifeless objects like Ayers Rock, which is a sacred object to native peoples. Does this object indeed have a non-physical aspect that a porous society can detect, or is the sanctity of the object purely a product of the consciousness of the native people?----

I responded to the second paragraph above, but leave it in for context of the first paragraph.

Here I found myself thinking of an understanding of God that is common among Christian thinkers, at least. It's this. Nothing has existence apart from the sustaining will of God. But nothing, no thing, is of the same "nature" of God. God is the ground of being, but God is also wholly other than any thing. To be truly apart from God would be annihilation -- to be nothing. Yet nothing is an "emanation" of God, a flowing-out from His essence; it is His creature.

So the rock, the tree, the ape, the human, their reality is all grounded in God, they could not be otherwise, but none of them is a "part" of God. I don't know if that's helpful as a response to this comment.

Sawfish wrote:

---Then we can move on to sacred animals. Unlike the rock, they have some level of consciousness--like a human, but less so--and do they independently contain this non-physical sacred attribute, like the rock, and if so, are they aware of it? And if not, then this, too, is a product of mankind's awareness, and has no independent existence.----

Everything "belongs to" God, including we ourselves -- an idea generally displeasing to the buffered self. The Psalms have passages about the mountains, seas, land and sea creatures, and so on as God's. Some of the Psalms even do seem to attribute sentience to inhabitants of the lesser creation, e.g. the fields "clapping their hands" to praise God. So maybe the ancient Israelites allowed for some kind of sentience there too; or it was just poetic license.... or we're not looking at it the right way by saying it's either/or.... .....

Finally, Sawfish asked, "Could it be the other way around: self-awareness is a product of mental complexity?"

I think I'll stick with what I wrote, "I might see our complexity as a byproduct of self-awareness."

When I question myself --

and does any animal, however much "higher," question "itself"? I doubt it could because I doubt it has a self --

When I question myself, I can engage in more complex thinking.

I think I'm about caught up now! Time for a break.

You can doubt it, Dale, only by flying in the face of known biological facts. "However much 'higher'"?. They have self-awareness, yes, unquestionably.

jkh

It's more that I doubt that, when the claim is made about primates' "self-awareness," "self-awareness" means what I have in mind. Apparently to recognize the image in a mirror as "me" is not really the thing I mean. I'm thinking of a capacity to think about oneself, to evaluate oneself, to make decisions about oneself, etc. We know that we have this capacity. If these animals possess this capacity, how was this shown?

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> It's more that I doubt that, when the claim is
> made about primates' "self-awareness,"
> "self-awareness" means what I have in mind.
> Apparently to recognize the image in a mirror as
> "me" is not really the thing I mean. I'm thinking
> of a capacity to think about oneself, to evaluate
> oneself, to make decisions about oneself, etc. We
> know that we have this capacity. If these animals
> possess this capacity, how was this shown?


I think that the threshold act is to understand that the image in the mirror is not another primate or canine, but in fact seems to duplicate my actions, and the animal recognizes this. I'm not sure that my cats, or any dogs, ever truly made the full connection, but what they were pretty confident of was that their reflection was NOT another cat/dog. They may have let it go at that, I don't know.

All of the other perceptive accoutrements are extension of this recognition (if it happens) and are indicators of complexity of abstract thought.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

"All of the other perceptive accoutrements are extension of this recognition" -- I'm not sure that's correct. It feels to me like the profound difference between recognizing a mirror image and having the capacity to evaluate oneself, including the accuracy of one's own memories, is being underestimated. I see no reason to think that any animal has such a capacity or would ever attain it by the exercise of the faculty that enables the mirror-reaction we have had in mind. At most the kind of awareness (I won't call it self-awareness) that Kipling refers to might be a necessary condition for self-awareness as I understand it, without being sufficient, no matter how acute it is, for us to be able to say true selfhood exists. For my part I think I'll leave it at that.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> "All of the other perceptive accoutrements are
> extension of this recognition" -- I'm not sure
> that's correct.

I'm not either.

> It feels to me like the profound
> difference between recognizing a mirror image and
> having the capacity to evaluate oneself, including
> the accuracy of one's own memories, is being
> underestimated.

Dale, that's making a long jump into mental complexity. It's very advanced.

What I'm postulating is that this complexity that permits the recognition of the self as distinct from the remainder of creation exists along...AHEM...a continuum. Once you can perceive that your image is actually in some fashion connected to *you*, as a distinct entity, you're on the path to self-evaluation, analytic exploration of one's memories, etc.

The entity that first crosses that threshold or self-recognition has no guarantee that s/he is capable of fully exploring one's self. They may only get to incomplete self-recognition, and I'd postulate taht many humans cannot get far along this path, although all of them should be able to go farther long it than a dog.

> I see no reason to think that any
> animal has such a capacity or would ever attain it
> by the exercise of the faculty that enables the
> mirror-reaction we have had in mind.

Agreed, although they may well have recognized themselves as distinct from other such animate objects.

> At most the
> kind of awareness (I won't call it self-awareness)
> that Kipling refers to might be a necessary
> condition for self-awareness as I understand it,
> without being sufficient, no matter how acute it
> is, for us to be able to say true selfhood exists.
> For my part I think I'll leave it at that.

So be it.

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

"So be it"?! Really, Sawfish? Why capitulate to such absurd generalizations? And demonstrably false statements, as any competent wildlife biologist could tell you guys. Dale's usage, I must say, is a tipoff to his erroneous thought process on this aspect of your otherwise fascinating exchange. He uses ""it" twice in the same sentence, and """they", and "any animal", and so on. If that isn't obvious generalized anthropomorphic self-justification, I don't know what else to call it. Dale, you say (repeating the "I see no reason to think" overture again), that no animal has the capacity for both memory and the ability to evaluate their previous experiences, or to anticipate future results based upon past experiences. You're wrong. Apes and I daresay other species do have this capacity. To deny that is to deny the results of biological research, field studies, and everyday observations of zoologists, farmers and keen observers of animal behaviour in all walks of life. Pleading ignorance is not a good move, gentleman. Checkmate.

jkh

I think you misunderstand me, Kipling. I didn't say "no animal has the capacity for both memory and the ability to evaluate their previous experiences, or to anticipate future results based upon past experiences." I would grant most, at least, of this.

I said I know of no evidence (which leaves open the possibility of that evidence being provided by you or someone else, if it exists) that animals can "evaluate [themselves], including the accuracy of [their] own memories." Even very small children can say, "I forgot." No animal, so far as anyone knows, is ever aware that it has forgotten anything.

I know of no evidence that animals take responsibility for their actions -- much less take responsibility their thoughts. Even small children can, and do, do that: "I will not be afraid at the doctor's today." I know of no evidence that animals can conceptualize possible, different outcomes. Perhaps I will be able to find the note I wrote within the past few years about overhearing a small child reproach another about what could have happened because of what he had done -- I'm sorry that I can't be specific. Does any animal possess any understanding of contingency comparable to this?

I doubt that any animal perceives "itself" as possessing agency. I doubt that any animal cautions "itself" about taking action till it has more information.

Don't be angry with me for writing such remarks. If the data are out there, I'll be interested. Otherwise I retain the sense that there is a difference not just of degree but of kind between even the highest animals and human beings. (Note that I don't think this gives man the "right" to mistreat them. Rather, it implies the responsibility of treating them rightly. No animals, Kipling, can be stewards of us, and, on the other hand, we can't not be stewards of them -- under God, as I believe. We may be bad stewards or good ones, but we are stewards of them, even the ones that protect us, feed us, entertain us with their antics, etc.)



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 14 Aug 23 | 11:01AM by Dale Nelson.

Dale, I really don't have a dog in this fight (YEOW!) but I really do think that perhaps you're coming at this particular argument from a pre-determined position of mankind's ontological superiority to the animal kingdom--that indeed "we" are something else.

Growing up I automatically thought that, not from direct instruction, but by what amounts to "common knowledge"--it's what everyone said and hence was true.

But later as I experienced life, and during most of that time had either cats or dogs, I observed behaviors that looked, well..., thoughtful. I had/have no emotional need to anthropomorphize them (nor do I wish to be a cat--if I acted like a cat, I should rightly be in jail) but I could see things like a cat *really* taking extraordinary care in exploring a new object--like perhaps he had interpreted potential danger to himself. Dogs, while dreaming, going thru what appeared to be a range of emotions, from aggression to anxiety. They were therefore witnessing a dream narrative, with themselves as actors in it. Their subconscious projected their individual identity into the narrative.

Now, I have no idea what this means, but it appears to me that it is not simple; on the contrary, it appears to be fairly complex.

What I propose, Dale, is that mankind is as far advanced along a continuum of mental complexity and abstraction as a bloodhound is advanced over mankind in the sense of smell. We don't lack a sense of smell, but neither do they lack some level of mental complexity.

Mental complexity is "our thing", our evolutionary advantage, just as sense of smell is the canine's "thing".

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

"I really do think that perhaps you're coming at this particular argument from a pre-determined position of mankind's ontological superiority to the animal kingdom"

Sure. I suppose others commenting here likewise bring their own positions to bear on the topic.

I'm open to animal awareness to a greater degree than probably many people are, for example, that some animals may feel something we could call gratitude; or that some pets may sense illness and instinctively comfort the caregiving human.

Perhaps I'm being asked to concede something not about animals, but about what it means for a creature to be a self.

My impression is that, often, the same people who want to minimize the difference between animal and human, want likewise to minimize the difference between human intelligence and "artificial intelligence."

But, again, I think I've shot my bolt; I've said a bunch of things that indicate why I am not willing to attribute self-awareness to animals, and haven't read anything to change my mind about those specific points.

This was a side discussion about levels of being, that was spun from the porous-buffered topic.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 14 Aug 23 | 01:47PM by Dale Nelson.

Dale Nelson Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> "I really do think that perhaps you're coming at
> this particular argument from a pre-determined
> position of mankind's ontological superiority to
> the animal kingdom"
>
> Sure. I suppose others commenting here likewise
> bring their own positions to bear on the topic.

Subjectivity is impossible to avoid, but I wanted to at least be open as to where I was coming from, and more importantly, how I evolved the position over years, starting from a "mankind vs the animal kingdom".

So you openly know my epistemological position.

>
> I'm open to animal awareness to a greater degree
> than probably many people are, for example, that
> some animals may feel something we could call
> gratitude; or that some pets may sense illness and
> instinctively comfort the caregiving human.
>
> Perhaps I'm being asked to concede something not
> about animals, but about what it means for a
> creature to be a self.

I'm not asking for a concession, simply a recognition not that mankind and animals are all members of the same domain, just differentially endowed with various evolved strengths, but merely that this *might* be so.

I'm not even sure of my own position, but based on what I've observed, it looks more likely than not that man is an animal in the same sense that a giraffe is. One is much better at treetop browsing than the other, while the situation is reversed in say, tool-making.

>
> My impression is that, often, the same people who
> want to minimize the difference between animal and
> human, want likewise to minimize the difference
> between human intelligence and "artificial
> intelligence."

I don't see this consideration as belonging in this discussion. It's like baggage.

We could start another discussion centered on an emerging smug arrogance in humanity; I believe that I see evidence of it. It would not have much to do with human/animal self-awareness, however.

>
> But, again, I think I've shot my bolt; I've said a
> bunch of things that indicate why I am not willing
> to attribute self-awareness to animals, and
> haven't read anything to change my mind about
> those specific points.

That's why I said "so be it" previously.

>
> This was a side discussion about levels of being,
> that was spun from the porous-buffered topic.

I think that the differentiation between the two social/psychologic/theological models (porous/buffered) has some level of validity, but I think you're working way too hard to shoehorn all of humanity cleanly into one or the other, and to ascribe a certain moral worth to each category. None of it is that clear or simple, in my opinion.

And now *my* bolt is shot...

--Sawfish

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The food at the new restaurant is awful, but at least the portions are large."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sawfish wrote, "based on what I've observed, it looks more likely than not that man is an animal in the same sense that a giraffe is. One is much better at treetop browsing than the other, while the situation is reversed in say, tool-making."

Not to continue the debate about animal selves, etc. -- but I'd say, Remember that the traditional hierarchy of being allows for human beings to be classified, in some sense, as animals. The higher levels include the lower. We have (or are) something that animals don't have or are not, plus that which animals have, and what plants have, and what minerals have. So I like to write tongue-in-cheek "Scholastic" definitions of Man such as "Man is the animal that makes promises," or "Man is the animal that digresses." We are animals in that we do what animals do (we exist, we have life, we eat, we reproduce, we alter our environment for our benefit), + more.

The traditional ontology allows also for a level above us that would, as a rule, be invisible to our senses. Like ourselves, these beings (call them angels) would exist, be alive (in some sense), be selves, and also possess, presumably, some faculty or faculties that human beings do not possess. These, it has been supposed, could include an immediate perception of truth rather than our acquisition of much, at least, of what we know, laboriously through the senses and by inference; and immortality; if the number of angels was created in a primordial time, there presumably have been no deaths of angels and no matings of angels to replenish the population. This of course is not a proof of the existence of angels. However, the traditional porous self will be able to allow for their existence on the basis of revelation and/or experience, where the buffered self will reject the whole idea.

That, by the way, leads me to something I wanted to throw out to the list. The buffered self culture in which we live has no place for angels, although the genuinely religious minority porous counterculture may do so. A great many people really would not like the idea of angels, good or bad, impinging on human existence. So angels are out of the picture and we breathe a sigh of relief.

But then we propose that there ought to be creatures on other planets. I think this is an important part of the imaginative life of many people. Among the "uneducated," this may take the form of enthusiastic collecting of alien plush toys and what not, enjoyment of conspiracy theories, and so on. Among the "educated," it takes the form of a scientistic assumption that "the conditions for life" in an inconceivably vast universe of uncountable galaxies of uncountable suns must exist, even if we have no evidence for such life; it is just not probable that in all that big universe we are "alone." We at least find the idea very appealing.

(And so Lovecraft populated the universe with a lovingly developed scheme of aliens on Yuggoth and so on. But discussion of Lovecraft and aliens might be better kept on the thread of differences between Lovecraft, Smith, and Howard.)